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CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION AND NARRATIVE: HOW
TO USE LITIGATION TO TELL COMPELLING CLIMATE
STORIES
GRACE NOSEK*
The U.S. government has not taken sufficient action to mitigate the
threat of dangerous climate change. Frustrated by the lack of action in the
legislative and executive branches, climate advocates turn to the judicial
branch and litigation to advance their cause. Litigation is important not
only for its ability to create substantive legal change, but also for its power
to generate media coverage and shape public and political discourse.
Research from across the social sciences highlights key psychologi-
cal challenges that can prevent the U.S. public from engaging with the sci-
ence of climate change, understanding the risks posed by climate change,
and feeling motivated to take corrective action. Research also shows that
the way in which a public health issue is framed powerfully shapes the
public debate and policy prescriptions for that issue. This Article exam-
ines how climate advocates can construct their litigation messaging in
light of this research to most effectively advance the climate movement
in the United States.
If used effectively, the medium of litigation offers a unique opportu-
nity to reframe climate change and overcome some of the public’s cognitive
hurdles to perceiving the true dangers of climate change. The structure
of litigation, which requires plaintiffs to trace their injuries—including
economic, social, and health-related injuries—to the actions of defendants,
allows climate advocates to leverage insights from the social sciences to
make their climate change narratives as salient as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the “IPCC”)
released its Fifth Assessment Report in 2014 finding that “[w]arming of
the climate system is unequivocal” and that “[h]uman influence on the
climate system is clear.”1 The IPCC concluded that “[c]ontinued emission
of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes
in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe,
pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.”2 According
to the World Health Organization, climate change already causes 400,000
deaths per year.3 The Obama White House released a report finding that
“[c]limate change is an urgent and growing threat to [America’s] national
security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and
conflicts over basic resources like food and water.”4
The human health, economic, national security, and environmen-
tal consequences of continued climate change are immense. Yet in its
Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC emphasizes that “we have the means
to limit climate change and its risks, with many solutions that allow for
continued economic and human development.”5 One such example is the
ability to replace carbon-intensive fossil fuels with renewable energy
sources. Scientists have demonstrated the economic and technological
feasibility of supplying one hundred percent of energy end uses in the
United States through wind, water, and solar energy in the near future.6
Their results indicate “that low-cost, reliable 100% [wind, water, solar]
systems should work many places worldwide.”7 Thus scientific and tech-
nological strategies exist to mitigate the profound consequences and
1 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SU7U-ASNF] [hereinafter IPCC 2014 REPORT SUMMARY].
2 Id. at 8.
3 WHO, DID YOU KNOW? BY TAKING ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE YOU ARE IMPROVING
YOUR HEALTH 2 (2014), http://www.who.int/globalchange/publications/didyouknow-gen
eral-public.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/9ZJF-4SZY].
4 THE WHITE HOUSE, FINDINGS FROM SELECT FEDERAL REPORTS: THE NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE 2 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/sites/default/files/docs/National_Security_Implications_of_Changing_Climate_Final_051
915.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PK5-YPFX].
5 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT v (2015), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/as
sessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL9N -ZE7V].
6 Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Low-cost solution to the grid reliability problem with 100% pene-
tration of intermittent wind, water, and solar for all purposes, 112 PNAS 15060, 15060 (2015).
7 Id.
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risks of climate change. It is critical to build the social and political will
to implement these mitigation measures.
Although the means to limit risks from climate change exist, there
is a closing window for their implementation. The IPCC warns that “[d]e-
laying global mitigation actions may reduce options for climate-resilient
pathways and adaptation in the future. Opportunities to take advantage
of positive synergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease
with time, particularly if limits to adaptation are exceeded.”8 The Austra-
lian Climate Commission called 2011–2020 the “critical decade” to address
and mitigate the risks of climate change.9
Given the magnitude and scope of the risk and the urgency of
action, many see national and international government regulation as
critical to addressing climate change. Yet national and international reg-
ulation fails to limit greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to the levels
climate scientists deem necessary.10 Non-profit organizations, govern-
ment officials, and concerned citizens use climate change litigation as
one strategy to fill the gaps left by insufficient national and international
regulation efforts. My Article focuses on this strategy, analyzing how liti-
gation can be used to most effectively advance the goals of climate miti-
gation. My research focuses on the United States, which scholars call the
“epicenter” of climate change litigation.11
The prospect of federal climate change regulation in the United
States grows dimmer with the results of the 2016 election. President
Donald Trump and several key members of his administration express
doubt about the reality of human-caused climate change.12 Most recently,
President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States
from the Paris Agreement on climate change.13 Thus, climate change
8 IPCC 2014 REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 31.
9 CLIMATE COMMISSION, THE CRITICAL DECADE 2013: CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE, RISKS
AND RESPONSES 4 (2013), http://www.climatecouncil.org.au/uploads/b7e53b20a7d6573e1a
b269d36bb9b07c.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XJE-KUQS].
10 JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY
PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 52 (Cambridge U. Press 2015).
11 Id. at 17.
12 Alexandra Wilts, Trump’s top environment official refuses to say if President believes
in climate change, THE INDEPENDENT (June 2, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news
/world/americas/us-politics/trump-climate-change-paris-agreement-scott-pruitt-epa-re
fuses-answer-president-believes-latest-a7770291.html [https://perma.cc/9XZA-M7SK].
13 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate
-accord [https://perma.cc/F874-Q6NB] [hereinafter Trump’s Paris Agreement Statement].
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litigation is likely to play an even more important role in the United
States in coming years.
Climate change litigation is important not only for its potential
to address regulatory gaps, but also for its ability to influence public
debate and social norms. Scholars continue to document the roles climate
change litigation plays in shaping social norms, including “(1) making
the political culture and public debate more climate-informed; (2) sup-
porting and galvanizing grassroots climate campaigns; and (3) translat-
ing abstract scientific concepts into tangible impacts that the general
public can understand and relate to better.”14 Litigation can also garner
media attention, which is important in shaping public perceptions of
climate change. Scholars find that media coverage and mobilization by
political elites and advocacy organizations are significant drivers of the
American public’s concern over climate change.15
Many posit that an increase in the American public’s perception
of the threat of climate change is crucial to government and private
action on the issue.16 The American public’s perception of climate change
and its attendant risks has fluctuated widely over the last several de-
cades, but climate change has never been a policy priority for the public.17
In a 2008 poll, only one percent of respondents thought climate change
and the environment should be President Obama’s top priority.18 In a
2014 poll by the Pew Research Center, respondents ranked climate
change second to last out of a list of twenty priorities for presidential and
congressional attention.19 Many scientists and advocates believed that
the key to increasing public concern over climate change was more and
better news coverage on the science of climate change.20 But that theory
recently faced challenges.21 If the issue is not one of scientific literacy,
what are the barriers to communicating climate change to the public?
Why do so few Americans still believe in and prioritize climate change?
An emerging body of psychological research identifies cognitive
barriers to fully understanding and accepting the threat of climate change.
14 PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 224.
15 Robert J. Brulle et al., Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment
of factors influencing concern over climate change in the U.S., 2002–2010, 114 CLIMACTIC
CHANGE 169, 182 (2012).
16 See, e.g., id. at 170.
17 Id.
18 Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public
Engagement, 51 ENV’T: SCI. AND POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 12, 14 (2009).
19 Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L. J. 695, 708 (2016).
20 Nisbet, supra note 18, at 14.
21 Nisbet, supra note 18, at 14–22; Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 700.
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Scholars and policymakers are beginning to turn to psychological re-
search and framing theory in an effort to overcome the potent legal and
political roadblocks to addressing climate change in the United States.22
Yet, there is little comprehensive analysis of how this emerging research
might be applied to climate change litigation in the United States. This
Article seeks to address that gap, by exploring how pro-regulatory climate
litigants might harness framing theory and psychological research to most
effectively advance their cause both inside and outside of the courtroom.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief history and scope of climate
litigation in the United States. Part II will provide an overview of key
features of human cognition posited to influence the public’s perception
of climate change, including research on cognitive hurdles to addressing
collective action problems and the features of laypeople’s risk assessment.
It will also discuss how to activate moral intuition and empower the
public on climate change. Part III will analyze the importance of framing
to climate change communications. Framing builds off of insights from
psychology, including insights discussed in Part II, as well as work in
sociology, anthropology, and political communications.23 I will analyze
how the framing of climate change profoundly impacts peoples’ beliefs
about who should be responsible for its impacts, and whether action
should be taken to mitigate and prevent its potential consequences. This
Part will also draw comparisons to two other public health issues, smok-
ing and obesity, to demonstrate how important framing is to galvanizing
public and government action. The insights gleaned from Parts II and III
will be used in Part IV to analyze three contemporary, high-profile climate
change litigation strategies to understand how pro-regulatory climate
lawsuits are and are not leveraging insights from other fields to deliver
the most potent message in the courtroom and in the public eye.
There are, of course, limitations to how much climate change liti-
gation can advance the climate movement without corresponding executive
and legislative action or public outcry.24 However, this Article argues that
if used effectively, the medium of litigation offers a unique opportunity to
reframe climate change and overcome the public’s cognitive hurdles to per-
ceiving the true dangers of climate change. Emphasizing the current eco-
nomic, social, and public health consequences of climate change, as well
as the imminence of more profound consequences can make the risks
more salient to the public. Activating moral intuition on climate change,
22 See, e.g., Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 695–96.
23 Nisbet, supra note 18, at 15–16.
24 See, e.g., PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 223.
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by describing it as the consequence of the intentional actions of certain
actors, can be a highly motivating cue for corrective action. Framing cli-
mate change as a risk intentionally imposed on innocent victims is also
a motivating narrative. The structure of litigation, which requires plain-
tiffs to trace their injuries—including economic, social, and health-
related injuries—to the actions of defendants, allows climate advocates
to leverage these insights to make their climate change narratives as
salient as possible.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
The Guardian’s March 2017 article details the spate of high-profile
climate change lawsuits filed around the world.25 South Africa’s high
court just ruled against the government in the country’s first-ever climate
change litigation case.26 Another article from the U.S. story details how
attorneys general from progressive states are suing to protect Obama-era
emissions standards for vehicles.27 The case portends the onslaught of
climate change litigation likely to follow during the Trump administration.
Climate change litigation continues in twenty-seven countries, as
well as in international tribunals.28 Although the phenomenon of climate
change litigation spreads, the United States still has the most climate
lawsuits of any other country.29 The Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law at Columbia Law School partnered with Arnold & Porter LLP to track
climate litigation in the United States through the U.S. Climate Change
Litigation database.30 As of the writing of this Article, the U.S. Climate
Change Litigation database included more than 700 cases.31
25 Tessa Khan, How climate change battles are increasingly being fought, and won, in
court, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017
/mar/08/how-climate-change-battles-are-increasingly-being-fought-and-won-in-court
?mc_cid=8329a1ae39&mc_eid=0b9f078224 [https://perma.cc/K9MT-WXQA].
26 Id.
27 Reid Wilson, Blue states rush to block Trump’s emissions rollback, THE HILL (Mar. 15,
2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/324179-blue-states-rush-to-block-trumps
-emissions-rollback [https://perma.cc/2VS2-6LW5].
28 See Climate Change Litigation: Non-U.S. Jurisdiction, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
LAW & ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/cli
mate-change-litigation/non-us-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/XW58-DKCL] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2018).
29 PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 2.
30 Climate Change Litigation: Non-U.S. Jurisdiction, supra note 28.
31 Id.
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What accounts for this surge of climate change litigation in the
United States? Scholars point to several factors, including the country’s
litigious nature, as well as the federal government’s history of failure to
address climate change.32 This history includes the United States’ “failure
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to enact comprehensive national climate
legislation.”33 These failures have a significant impact on global climate
change. The United States produces fourteen percent of global carbon diox-
ide emissions, making it the second biggest emitter after China.34 It also
has one of the highest rates of carbon dioxide emissions per capita in the
world.35 The United States’ outsized role in contributing to climate change
and its failure to create a comprehensive national policy to address cli-
mate change have increased the importance of climate change litigation
in the country.36
A. History and Features of Climate Change Litigation in the
United States
Climate change litigation has a relatively long history in the United
States. The first climate change case, decided in 1990, was City of Los
Angeles v. National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA).37 That case, where cities, states, and environmental groups
challenged a government agency’s failure to undertake an analysis of the
climate consequences of one of its actions, has since become a “ ‘prototype’
for the vast majority of US climate change litigation brought subse-
quently.”38 Seventeen years after that first case, in 2007, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its groundbreaking decision in Massachusetts v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency.39 That decision coincided with an exponential
32 PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 17.
33 Id.
34 PBL NETHERLANDS ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY & EUROPEAN COMM’N’S JOINT RES.
CTR., TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS: 2016 REPORT 13 (2016), http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa
.eu/news_docs/jrc-2016-trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2016-report-103425.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KN3Z-E4WS].
35 Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Nov. 20,
2017), http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys
-share-of-co2.html#.WMhptCMrJ-U [https://perma.cc/7S2H-XCMS].
36 See id.
37 PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 19.
38 Id.
39 Samvel Varvastian, Climate Change Litigation, Liability and Global Climate
Governance—Can Judicial Policy-making Become a Game-changer 2 (May 2016) (unpub-
lished Berlin Conference paper, “Transformative Global Climate Governance apres
Paris”), http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS
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increase in U.S. climate change litigation.40 As the number of climate law-
suits in the United States ballooned, so did the diversity in claims.41 Several
scholars worked to categorize these different climate change lawsuits and
analyze their varying regulatory impacts.42 The Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law’s U.S. Climate Litigation database sorts the claims included
in U.S. climate change lawsuits43 into the following categories: federal
statutory claims, including claims brought under statutes like the Clean
Air Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered
Species Act; constitutional claims; state law claims; common law claims;
public trust claims; claims brought pursuant to securities and financial
regulation; claims arising in relation to trade agreements; adaptation
claims; and claims related to climate change protesters and scientists.44
As will be discussed later in the Article, such diverse legal strategies allow
climate advocates flexibility in determining how to best leverage psycho-
logical and framing research when initiating climate change litigation.
Although there are many different types of climate lawsuits, there
are overarching trends in U.S. climate change litigation. More climate
lawsuits challenge government action than the conduct of private par-
ties.45 The majority of cases focus on mitigation rather than adaptation.46
Legal challenges to coal-fired power plants are the most frequently filed
form of climate lawsuits.47 It is also important to note that although
initially climate change lawsuits were brought largely with a progressive,
pro-regulatory agenda, many lawsuits are now filed to block or stall action
on climate change mitigation.48
A full analysis of the typology of climate change lawsuits in the
United States is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, I want to give
a sense of the variety of the potential legal claims available to climate
advocates. The choice of whether to bring a claim against the government
or a private party or to bring a statutory claim or common law claim
obviously shapes the legal arguments available to climate advocates.
_derivate_000000006631/Varvastianxclimatexchangexlitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F4KS-HSPG].
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1–3.
42 See PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 35.
43 A case can appear in more than one category in the database if that case is categorized
as bringing more than one type of claim.
44 Climate Change Litigation: Non-U.S. Jurisdiction, supra note 28.
45 PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 10, at 19–20.
46 See id. at 20.
47 Id. at 83.
48 See id. at 19–20.
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However, those choices also have the potential to influence societal narra-
tives about climate change.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE PSYCHOLOGY
As previously discussed, the “IPCC” has found that the Earth’s
climate system is undoubtedly warming, warming is man-made, and
consequences of such warming on humanity will be profoundly deleteri-
ous.49 A 2016 synthesis review found scientific consensus on anthropo-
genic climate change to be between ninety and one hundred percent.50
Yet, many Americans still do not believe either that climate change is
happening or that it is man-made.51 In contrast to the IPCC’s report on
climate change, most Americans perceive the warming climate as a
“relatively distant threat.”52 What accounts for this gap between scien-
tific consensus and the U.S. public’s perceptions of the existence and
severity of climate change? Researchers have identified a series of fea-
tures of human cognition that make it difficult for the public to engage
with climate change science and take action on climate change.53 These
features can impede belief in climate change.54 They can also attenuate
the perception of risk and shape how and whether citizens think the U.S.
government should address climate change.55 Given litigation’s role in
influencing public discourse on climate change, it is important to under-
stand how pro-regulatory climate litigation can draw on this research to
potentially overcome the public’s cognitive hurdles to engaging with
climate science and governance.
Interestingly, the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report explicitly acknowl-
edges that individuals have inherent cognitive limitations and biases that
can prevent them from making the most societally beneficial decisions on
49 See IPCC 2014 REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 2, 8.
50 John Cook et al., Consensus on consensus: A synthesis of consensus estimates on
human-caused global warming, 11 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 6 (2016).
51 See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: NOV. 2016,
YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMM. & GEO. MASON CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
COMM. 3–4 (2017), http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Cli
mate-Change-American-Mind-November-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ZB-HQGS].
52 Id. at 3.
53 See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE. WORKING GROUP
III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 160–68 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3
/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2E5-2EPM].
54 See id.
55 See id.
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climate change.56 The Report discusses the importance of understanding
these cognitive biases and framing climate mitigation strategies in such a
way as to overcome these cognitive hurdles.57 Such insights can be used to
make the public and decision-makers more receptive to climate policies.58
Scholars found that the United States has an unusually high rate
of climate skepticism compared to other countries.59 They point to several
factors that might help explain this skepticism, including more uncon-
tested skeptical coverage of climate change in right-leaning media sources
“coupled with a particularly polarized political system and influential
fossil fuel industry interests . . . .”60 Such findings underscore the impor-
tance of media narratives of climate change in shaping public perception
of the issue. They also underscore how critical it is to draw from psycho-
logical research to create more salient narratives on climate change.
In this Part, I will discuss research from across the social sciences
on several key features of human cognition that are posited to influence
human perception of and engagement with climate change and climate
science. I will begin by highlighting the many cognitive hurdles prevent-
ing the public from effectively addressing collective action problems like
climate change. Then I will focus more specifically on risk assessment,
and the role culture, ideology, and heuristics can play in the public’s per-
ception of the risks of climate change. Finally, I will outline the impor-
tance of moral intuition to climate change perceptions. I will also analyze
potential strategies to overcome these cognitive hurdles in climate change
communications. Although I have broken these cognitive features into
sections for ease of understanding and analysis—and because the litera-
ture often groups certain features together—the features overlap and
interact in complex ways. My goal is not to be exhaustive in my analysis
of climate change psychology, but to show how features of cognition can
be a significant barrier to climate action.
A. Cognitive Hurdles to Addressing Collective Action Problems
The “tragedy of the commons” refers to the often-intractable prob-
lem of managing commonly held resources.61 In his article, Barton H.
56 See id. at 160.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See Stuart Capstick et al., International trends in public perceptions of climate change
over the past quarter century, 6 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 35, 54 (2014).
60 Id.
61 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons
1 (Stan. L. Sch. John M. Olin Program in L. And Econ., Working Paper No. 187, 2000).
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Thompson, Jr. explains the tragedy of the commons in the following terms:
“Where resources are freely available to everyone in common, everyone
has an incentive to take as much of that resource as they want, even
though the collective result may be the destruction of the resource itself.”62
Climate change offers an interesting twist on the tragedy of the commons—
users are not removing too much of a resource, they are depositing too
much of a waste product, GHG emissions, into the atmosphere.63 Thompson
describes three cognitive hurdles that make it difficult for humans to ad-
dress collective action problems like climate change: “people are reticent
to accept current losses to avoid future risks, the dilemmas are charac-
terized by significant scientific and social uncertainty, and users heavily
discount the probability and cost of future losses.”64
One of the key cognitive hurdles to addressing collective action
problems is the problem of scientific and social uncertainty.65 Collective
action problems are often large and complex.66 Such issues can be dogged
by scientific uncertainty about the current and future state of the resource
as well as how human action affects the resource.67 The issues can also
engender social uncertainty about the most equitable and appropriate
strategies for dividing the burden of protecting the shared resource.68
Scientific uncertainty about the health of a collective resource can facili-
tate “wishful thinking.”69 Experiments suggest that “people use [scien-
tific] uncertainty to willingly fool themselves that the [resource] is in better
shape and under less threat than it is in fact.”70 Certain features of cli-
mate change make it particularly susceptible to scientific uncertainty.71
Thompson describes climate change as affecting “hidden resources” because
people cannot see climate systems and have few tangible indications of
how their actions affect such systems.72 As mentioned above, scientific
uncertainty in the United States continues to plague climate advocacy.73
Despite near universal scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate
62 Id.
63 See id. at 16.
64 Id. at Abstract.
65 See id. at 23.
66 See id. at 4.
67 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 23.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 24.
70 Id. at 25.
71 See id. at 23.
72 Id.
73 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 23.
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change, a sizeable group of Americans still doubts either that the climate
is warming or the warming is caused by humans.74
To address collective action issues, advocates must overcome both
scientific and social uncertainty.75 Not only must people believe that a
shared resource is in danger and human actions contribute to that danger,
but they must work out how to equitably divide the burden of saving that
shared resource. This can be difficult because:
People contribute in different degrees to the problem, and
people benefit to different degrees from a solution. In these
settings, there are multiple ways to allocate the burden of
reducing resource use and no generally accepted societal
norms for how to choose between the various allocations.76
Climate change is a prime illustration of a collective action issue
that has many possible burden allocation strategies and no societal con-
sensus on the most fair or appropriate way to allocate the burden.77 One
clear example is the fraught international debate over the relative respon-
sibilities of developed and developing countries to reduce carbon emis-
sions and mitigate climate change. A large block of developing countries
consistently maintains that developed countries must take on the lion’s
share of emissions reductions, as well as provide assistance for develop-
ing countries, because industrialized nations are largely responsible for
man-made climate change and they have superior economic resources.78
Developed countries resist such arguments, contending that some “devel-
oping” countries are wealthy and emit a large portion of GHGs.79 Such
disagreement arose once again in 2015 during the negotiation of the
Paris Agreement,80 underscoring the continuing lack of societal consen-
sus on who should bear the burden of mitigating climate change.
President Trump recently leveraged social uncertainty over burden
allocation in his statement announcing the eventual withdrawal of the
United States from the Paris Agreement. He argued that the Agreement
74 LEISEROWITZ ET AL., supra note 51, at 3–4.
75 See Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 23.
76 Id. at 25–26.
77 See id.
78 See Wolfgang Obergassel et al., Phoenix from the Ashes—An Analysis of the Paris Agree-
ment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 8, WUPPERTAL
INST. FOR CLIMATE, ENV’T, AND ENERGY (2016).
79 Id.
80 Id.
746 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:733
requires the United States to make disproportionate GHG emissions re-
ductions and financial sacrifices in comparison to other countries like
China and India, saying:
[U]nder the agreement, China will be able to increase these
emissions by a staggering number of years—13. They can
do whatever they want for 13 years. Not us. India makes
its participation contingent on receiving billions and bil-
lions and billions of dollars in foreign aid from developed
countries. There are many other examples. But the bottom
line is that the Paris Accord is very unfair, at the highest
level, to the United States.81
President Trump’s statement could be a salient message to some in the
United States. Research shows that when there are several possible ways
to allocate the burden for addressing a collective action issue, people
assume “that the [way] that benefits them is the fairest.”82
Another key cognitive hurdle to governing collective action prob-
lems is how people make intertemporal tradeoffs.83 Humans locked in a
tragedy of the commons situation “appear to extravagantly discount the
future consequences of their current actions.”84 The result is that individ-
uals are unlikely to take a loss or make a sacrifice in the present to prevent
a larger but uncertain loss in the future.85 Thompson discusses several
cognitive features that might account for why individuals heavily dis-
count future consequences in commons dilemmas.86 He explains that
“[d]istant losses . . . appear to weigh far more heavily in people’s decision
making than distant gains. But where the loss is risky and uncertain,
people often act as if there’s virtually no future risks to them at all.”87
People believe they can outmaneuver uncertain future risks when they
eventually confront them, especially when implementing preventive mea-
sures in the present is costly.88
There are several potential strategies to overcoming the cognitive
hurdles preventing people from effectively governing the commons.
81 Trump’s Paris Agreement Statement, supra note 13.
82 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 26.
83 Id. at 20.
84 Id. at 30.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 32.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 See Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 32.
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Thompson describes the three steps that will be key to any solution:
persuading people to believe there is a problem, and that the problem
requires a solution; building consensus around a solution to the collective
action problem; and reaching agreement about who should bear the
burden of the solution.89
In persuading resource users that a collective action problem
exists, climate advocates can use at least two tactics—reducing scientific
uncertainty and reducing discounting of future events.90 Thompson sug-
gests that one way to reduce discounting of future risks is to describe the
risks in more visceral terms.91 Such framing “will require us to go beyond
data to analogies; to pictures; [and to teaching people exactly what it will
mean] . . . if global warming modifies disease vectors in North America.”92
Another strategy is to highlight the current costs of collective action
problems like climate change.93 Such costs accrue long before the collapse
of a shared resource.94 As Thompson notes, “[e]ach of these costs of overuse
is definite, rather than uncertain, and immediate, rather than distant.”95
Thompson offers several strategies for how to facilitate agreement
on a potential framework solution to a collective action problem.96 One is
to communicate that taking no action, or keeping the status quo, is an
active choice just like any other.97 This is important because “[t]o most peo-
ple, maintaining the status quo is the presumed natural position against
which any other action must be justified.”98 Thompson also notes that the
most successful proffered solutions will account for the business and cul-
tural needs of individuals.99 They will also maximize individual freedom.100
The final step in any strategy to overcome the cognitive hurdles
preventing solutions to tragedies of the commons is reaching agreement
on how to divide the burden of addressing the tragedy.101 Experiments
suggest that “[a]s resource users learn more about others’ perceptions of
fairness, and the reasons for those perceptions, the user’s own view of the
89 See id. at 41.
90 See id. at 41–42.
91 Id. at 48.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 48.
95 Id. at 49.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 50.
100 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 51.
101 Id. at 53.
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fairest result grows less biased.”102 Thompson notes that “[l]awsuits and
political pressure may be important—even crucial—in encouraging local
resource users to discuss the problem they confront and [to] consider so-
lutions to the problem.”103
B. Cognition and Risk Assessment
How people engage with the threat of climate change depends in
large part on how they assess future risks. Psychologists consistently
demonstrate that how individuals process information influences how
they analyze risks.104 They also show that there is an important diver-
gence in how experts and laypeople analyze environmental risks, which
can lead to disputes over whether an environmental risk should be deemed
significant.105 There are several key theories on human cognition that
help explain how humans assess risk, and thus how they assess the
threat of climate change.106 These theories examine the roles of emotion,
heuristics, and cultural and political worldviews in risk assessment.107
1. Heuristics and Information Processing
One of the key theories explaining the gap between how experts
and laypeople analyze risk is that laypeople rely heavily on heuristics to
process information.108 Heuristics can be described as judgmental rules
or knowledge structures.109 Serena Chen et al. give the following example
of a heuristic: “Consensus opinions are correct.”110 Psychologists have long
posited that humans use two systems to process information: “ ‘a fast,
associative’ one ‘based on low-effort heuristics,’ and a ‘slow, rule based’ one
that relies on ‘high-effort systemic reasoning.’”111 Daniel Kahneman de-
scribes these two systems as approximating the lay conceptions of intuition
102 Id.
103 Id. at 37.
104 William Boyd et al., Law, Environment, and the “Nondismal” Social Sciences, 8 ANNU.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 183, 185 (2012).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 185–90.
108 Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection, 8 JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING 407, 407 (2013).
109 Serena Chen et al., Motivated heuristic and systematic processing, 10 PSYCHOL. IN-
QUIRY 44, 44 (1999).
110 Id.
111 Kahan, supra note 108, at 408.
2018] CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION AND NARRATIVE 749
and reasoning.112 Psychologists have labeled the heuristic-driven mode of
processing System 1, and the slower, low-effort mode of processing System
2.113 Laypeople often rely on System 1 when processing risk, whereas
experts rely on System 2 reasoning to assess societal risks.114 As Daniel
Kahan notes, this reliance on System 1 processing by laypeople can have
significant consequences for public perceptions of climate change risk:
The centrality of visceral, emotion-guided modes of percep-
tion can cause laypeople to overestimate the incidence and
harm associated with more sensational risks—such as
terrorist acts and gun accidents—relative to more remote,
less gripping hazards such as climate change and swim-
ming pools.115
Thus, climate litigants may want to structure their litigation narratives
to describe the threat and consequences of climate change in visceral,
gripping terms to make those threats more salient to laypeople. I will
delve deeper into this analysis in Part IV.
2. Motivated Reasoning
Another key theory scholars use to explain why laypeople and
experts disagree over the significance of the threat of climate change is
motivated reasoning.116 Motivated reasoning is defined as “the tendency
of people to conform assessments of information to some goal or end ex-
trinsic to accuracy.”117 This theory posits that individuals’ desire to main-
tain their identities in communities unconsciously motivates them to
reject empirical data that might threaten those identities.118
3. The Interaction of Heuristic-Driven Information Processing
and Motivated Reasoning
There is substantial empirical support for both of the theories
described above: heuristic-driven information processing and motivated
112 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003).
113 Kahan, supra note 108, at 408.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Kahan, supra note 108, at 408.
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reasoning.119 However, there is significant and important scholarly dis-
agreement over how the two theories of information processing interact.120
There are various terms for the competing theories, but the disagreement
can be broadly divided into two theoretical camps.121 In his article, Kahan
calls the two camps the Bounded Rationality Position and the Expressive
Utility Position, and I will use those terms in this Article.122 The dis-
agreement is particularly important for climate change communications,
and for the purposes of this Article, because the two theories posit differ-
ent strategies to effectively communicate the risks of climate change to
the public.123 Below, I will highlight both theories and analyze their im-
portance to climate change communications.
a. Bounded Rationality Position
Both the Bounded Rationality Position and the Expressive Utility
Position attempt to explain how heuristic-driven information processing,
motivated reasoning, and ideological persuasions interact to influence
societal assessments of risk.124 The Bounded Rationality Position posits
that the influence of heuristic-driven information processing is pivotal to
explaining the variance in the public’s perception of societal risks like cli-
mate change,125 while the Expressive Utility Position posits that the influ-
ence of ideological and cultural persuasions is key.126 In the Bounded
Rationality Position account, “public conflict over risk and other policy
relevant facts is a consequence of the predominance of heuristic-driven,
System 1 information processing, which interferes with the public’s under-
standing of complicated evidence and motivates it to assess evidence
consistently with cultural or ideological predispositions.”127 Thus, the
theory “treat[s] cultural cognition—the conforming of beliefs to the ones
that predominate within one’s group—as simply one of the unreliable Sys-
tem 1 heuristics used to compensate for the inability to assess scientific
information in a dispassionate, analytical manner.”128 The key takeaway
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 409–10.
123 Id. at 410.
124 Id. at 409.
125 Kahan, supra note 108, at 408.
126 Id. at 408–09.
127 Id. at 416.
128 Dan M. Kahan et al., The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on per-
ceived climate change risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 733 (2012).
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is that, according to the Bounded Rationality Position, System 1 thinking
is the driving force behind the gap between experts’ and laypeople’s
assessment of the risks of climate change.
What do proponents of this account suggest to better the U.S.
public’s perception of the risks of climate change? Scholars offer several
strategies, including promoting “nonpersuasive” climate change commu-
nications.129 Nonpersuasive communication is strictly informational in
nature and does not contain hidden policy agendas.130 Scientists should
also protect climate science from false characterizations.131 They also sug-
gest using different frames for climate change communications, including
a risk management frame, where science helps illuminate the range of
climate change risks and the consequences of various policy options.132
I will discuss climate change frames in far more detail in Part III.
b. Expressive Utility Position
The Expressive Utility Position emphasizes the central impor-
tance of cultural and ideological worldviews to perceptions of risk, argu-
ing that the motivation to adhere to such worldviews is more influential
than heuristic-driven information processing.133 According to this ac-
count, increasing scientific literacy alone cannot overcome the cognitive
biases inherent in cultural and ideological worldviews.134 Indeed, in con-
trast to the Bounded Rationality Position, the Expressive Utility Position
posits that citizens with higher degrees of science literacy and better
reasoning abilities will actually be the most polarized in their beliefs
about climate change.135 When applied to public perceptions of environ-
mental risks, the Expressive Utility Position asserts:
[T]hat people who subscribe to a hierarchical, individualistic
world-view . . . tend to be skeptical of environmental risks.
Such people intuitively perceive that widespread acceptance
of such risks would license restrictions on commerce and
129 Elke U. Weber & Paul C. Stern, Public Understanding of Climate Change in the U.S.,
66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 315, 323 (2011).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 323.
133 Kahan, supra note 108, at 410.
134 Id. at 418.
135 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 732–33.
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industry, forms of behavior that hierarchical individualists
value. In contrast, people who hold an egalitarian, commu-
nitarian worldview . . . tend to be morally suspicious of
commerce and industry, to which they attribute social ineq-
uity. They therefore find it congenial to believe those forms
of behaviour are dangerous and worthy of restriction.136
One experiment found that polarization on climate change in-
creased in correlation with increased quantitative analytical ability and
scientific literacy.137 How could having stronger analytical abilities and
scientific understanding lead some individuals to be less concerned about
climate change? Kahan offers the following explanation: “For ordinary
citizens, the reward for acquiring greater scientific knowledge and more
reliable technical-reasoning capacities is a greater facility to discover and
use—or explain away—evidence relating to their groups’ positions.”138
Thus, at the individual level, it is rational for people to fit scien-
tific evidence into their cultural worldviews.139 The problem is that on the
aggregate such motivated cognition can lead to inaction on serious
environmental threats.140 The danger is compounded when environmen-
tal risks are imbued with ideological meaning.141 Scholars document a
recent increase in partisan polarization in beliefs about the existence and
threat of climate change.142 They also argue that certain conservative
organizations in the United States actively campaigned to make climate
change an ideologically partisan issue, writing that “conservative activ-
ists have managed to elevate ‘climate change to the status of a litmus
test of cultural politics in the U.S., up there with abortion, guns, god, gays,
immigration and taxes.’ ”143
If the Expressive Utility Position has merit, then increasing sci-
entific understanding and analytical reasoning in the United States will
not be sufficient to significantly increase the public’s concern over the
threat of climate change. So what can be done? Kahan suggests that the
136 Id. at 732.
137 Id. at 732–33.
138 Id. at 734.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 734.
142 Riley E. Dunlap et al., The Political Divide on Climate Change: Partisan Polarization
Widens in the U.S., 58 ENV’T: SCI. AND POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 4, 14 (2016).
143 Id. at 15.
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key is creating a climate where believing in scientific evidence does not
force individuals to depart from their ideological worldviews.144 Specific
tactics “include use of culturally diverse communicators, whose affinity
with different communities enhances their credibility, and information-
framing techniques that invest policy solutions with resonances congenial
to diverse groups.”145 What might these information-framing techniques
look like? Scholars have suggested that those who subscribe to a hierar-
chical worldview might be more receptive to information about climate
threats if the threats are framed as risks to world order or catalysts for
military action.146 They also suggest that market-based solutions will
resonate most deeply with this group.147
Kahan notes that most scientific evidence underlying policy pre-
scriptions, including, for example, the importance of pasteurizing milk,
does not have the same ideological polarization as climate science.148 Even
when such scientific evidence is polarized, it might be possible to lessen
the polarization.149 Kahan cites the swing in public perception of the
dangers of smoking as an example of scientific evidence becoming less
ideologically polarizing over time.150 I will return to the case study of
smoking in the United States in Part III to analyze how climate litigants
might borrow from the tactics of anti-smoking advocates.
C. Moral Judgment
As discussed above, there are many important messages that
climate advocates must communicate to the public, sometimes simulta-
neously. They must continue convincing the public that climate change
is real and that the threat is pressing and significant.151 However, they
must also try to engage the public to act on climate change.152 There is a
body of psychological research describing how climate advocates might
activate people’s moral intuition about climate change and encourage
them to act.153 The research also underscores the particular features of
144 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 734.
145 Id.
146 Boyd et al., supra note 104, at 192.
147 Id.
148 Kahan, supra note 108, at 419.
149 Id. at 419–20.
150 Id.
151 LEISEROWITZ ET AL., supra note 51, at 3–4.
152 Id.
153 Ezra M. Markowitz & Azim F. Shariff, Climate change and moral judgment, 2 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 243, 243 (2012).
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climate change that make this moral activation so difficult.154 Below I
will discuss why moral intuition is important, why climate change often
fails to activate moral intuition, and what strategies might be used to
generate such intuition.
There is an important recent advance in the field of moral psy-
chology, with researchers recognizing “the powerful role that moral intu-
ition, driven by [individuals’] gut instincts, plays in motivating morally
relevant action.”155 Research found that those who consider climate change
through an ethical lens are more supportive of policies addressing cli-
mate change.156 Yet, “climate change does not register, emotionally, as a
wrong that demands to be righted.”157 Scholars believe this failure to reg-
ister as a wrong may cause people to be more complacent about addressing
the threat of climate change.158 In their article, Ezra M. Markowitz and
Azim F. Shariff highlight six reasons why climate change does not
provoke strong moral intuition.159 Some relate to cognitive hurdles pre-
viously discussed, including the uncertainty of climate science creating
wishful thinking, climate threats do not appear as visceral as other
threats, partisan views of morality, and climate threats appear distant
in time and space.160 I will focus on the other two, “the blamelessness of
unintentional action” and “guilty bias.”
1. Climate Change and Blamelessness
One of the key reasons why climate change does not activate
moral intuition in the same way as other issues is that it registers as the
unintentional consequence of certain actions rather than a purposeful
wrongdoing.161 There is research that “that unintentionally caused harms
are judged less harshly than equally severe but intentionally caused ones.
Recognizing a harmful event as the product of an intentional agent, on
the other hand, is a highly motivating cue for corrective action.”162 This
finding is especially relevant to litigation; because of the adversarial
nature of lawsuits and standing requirements, plaintiffs must identify
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 243–44.
160 Id. at 244.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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who to blame for a particular action and how that action has harmed
them. Thus, lawsuits might be particularly well suited to apportioning
blame for climate change, thereby motivating the public to support cor-
rective action. In Part IV I will discuss in detail the various ways to frame
blame and accountability for climate change.
2. Guilty Bias
Another cognitive feature preventing climate change from regis-
tering as a moral issue is guilty bias. Although, as discussed above, climate
change is not viewed as the result of intentional wrongdoing, messaging
blames people for lifestyle choices that contribute to GHG emissions.163
Researchers posit that these narratives induce negative emotions like
guilt and fear.164 To avoid these negative emotions, “individuals often en-
gage in biased cognitive processes to minimize perceptions of their own
complicity.”165 Additionally, “[t]hese biases are even more likely when
individuals and communities feel incapable of meaningfully responding
behaviourally.”166 People evade self-blame by underestimating evidence
of their own culpability and questioning the importance of the problem.167
The unfortunate result is “that those responsible for the greatest share of
harmful effects, whose behavioural changes would be most beneficial, are
the people most motivated to deny their complicity and resist change.”168
3. Potential Solutions
Markowitz and Shariff offer several strategies for how to over-
come these cognitive hurdles and activate people’s moral intuition about
climate change.169 Echoing strategies cited by other scholars, they sug-
gest that communicators frame climate change in terms salient to ideo-
logical conservatives.170 This might include speaking about climate
change in religious terms by highlighting the importance of stewardship.171
They also suggest that:
163 Id.
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165 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 244.
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[F]ocusing messaging on the burdens that unmitigated
climate change will leave on future generations (for exam-
ple, higher adaptation costs, greater human suffering from
disease) rather than on potential benefits (for example, a
viable, vibrant planet) may be a simple and easily admin-
istrated way to bolster the moral concern of individuals
over the impacts of climate change.172
A third suggested communications strategy is to focus on emo-
tional carrots rather than sticks.173 As discussed previously, using messag-
ing to induce negative emotions, like fear and guilt, about climate change
may actually backfire.174 Markowitz and Shariff underscore the impor-
tance of promoting positive emotions, like “hope, pride, and gratitude” to
generate enthusiasm for climate mitigation actions.175 These emotions
can prompt both individual and political action on climate change.176
To overcome the fact that the victims of climate change often ap-
pear distant in time and space, Markowitz and Shariff suggest strategies
to maximize the public’s ability to identify with climate change victims.177
They write that “communicators should adopt techniques that increase in-
dividuals’ affinity and identification with future generations (for example,
focusing specifically on identifiable future others such as one’s children),
which ‘can diminish interpersonal distance, decrease social discounting,
limit egocentric biases and enhance intergenerational beneficence.’ ”178
The field of climate psychology is rapidly expanding. Psychological
research helps us understand why it has been so difficult to get the
public to believe in, care about, and take action on climate change. It also
provides important insights into which narratives can help individuals
engage in the effort to address the threat of climate change. There are
several different ways pro-regulatory climate litigants can leverage these
findings, including deciding which kind of claims to bring, shaping
courtroom arguments, and crafting public relations strategies that will
resonate with the public. Part III will build on the research in this Part
to analyze which kind of previously used climate change frames might be
the most effective.
172 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 245.
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III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND FRAMING
How climate change is framed profoundly affects how the public
perceives the phenomenon. Frames “structure for the audience the cause
of social problems and prescribe which actors should and should not act
to address them.”179 This Part builds on the psychological research dis-
cussed in the previous Part, analyzing how actors can create the most
salient messaging on climate change given the cognitive hurdles dis-
cussed previously. There is some conceptual overlap among theories
discussed in this Part and in Part II, but for ease of reference and analy-
sis, I separate framing into its own Part. In this Part, I will describe what
framing is and explain why it is important to climate change communica-
tions. To underscore the importance of framing, I will draw parallels to
how frames are used to shape the public discourse around and societal
response to two other public health issues—smoking and obesity. Next,
I will draw from the literature to highlight frames frequently used in the
climate change discourse, as well as several frames that scholars think
are promising. Finally I will describe a frame that has not, as yet, ap-
peared in the literature—a freedom of speech frame— but which I think
is important to understanding climate change communications. This
example will help illuminate how frames do not exist in a vacuum: pro-
regulatory climate frames will always be countered with frames intended
to generate resistance and skepticism to climate science and action.
A. Framing
Framing, which builds on insights from psychology, anthropology,
political communications, and sociology,180 posits that how an issue is pre-
sented can profoundly impact how an audience perceives that issue.181
The concept draws on research done by Kahneman and Tversky analyzing
“how different presentations of essentially identical decision-making sce-
narios influence people’s choices and their evaluations of the various op-
tions presented to them.”182 The theory of framing includes two concepts:
one operating at the macro level, sometimes called a media frame, and
179 Lissy C. Friedman et al., Tobacco Industry Use of Personal Responsibility Rhetoric in
Public Relations and Litigation: Disguising Freedom to Blame as Freedom of Choice, 105
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 250, 250 (2015).
180 Nisbet, supra note 18, at 15–16.
181 Dietram A. Scheufele & David Tewksbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming:
The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models 57 J. OF COMM. 9, 11 (2007).
182 Id.
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one operating at the micro level, sometimes called an individual frame.183
Robert Entman states that at the core of what some call media framing
is selection and salience.184 He writes that “[t]o frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communi-
cating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommenda-
tion.”185 Micro or individual level frames are “mentally stored clusters of
ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.”186 A key insight
from framing theory is that communicators can deploy messaging that
activates clusters of ideas or frames that already exist for and resonate
with their audience.187
In understanding why framing is so critical to the public’s under-
standing of and engagement with climate change it is illuminating to
examine the importance of framing to the public debates over smoking
and obesity in the United States. In both case studies, industry members
and their political allies used frames to prevent government regulation.
B. Framing and Smoking
Scholars have documented how the tobacco industry used framing
to great effect over the last seventy years.188 One striking example of this
framing mastery is a 1976 public relations memo created for tobacco com-
pany R.J. Reynolds.189 The memo suggests various narratives or frames
the company should use when discussing the regulation of smoking,
including the following message: “Increased government participation in
our lives causes a loss of personal freedom. There is already too much
government interference in our private lives. We don’t need even more
government restriction of our proper personal freedoms.”190 In a section
discussing smokers’ rights, the memo offers the following frame: “Freedom
183 Id. at 12; Dietram A. Scheufele, Framing as a theory of media effects, 49 J. OF COMM.
103, 106 (1999).
184 Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. OF
COMM. 51, 52 (1993).
185 Id.
186 Scheufele, supra note 183, at 107 (citing Entman, supra note 184, at 53).
187 Scheufele, supra note 183, at 107.
188 Friedman et al., supra note 179, at 250.
189 See Issues and Answers, in RJ REYNOLDS RECORDS: MINNESOTA DOCUMENTS 3–4 (1976),
https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=pfmf0091
[https://perma.cc/2U4P-4FAW] (framing tobacco use as a personal use issue unfit for
government regulation).
190 Id. at 11.
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of choice is an American birthright. Infringement on this right is an
injustice.”191 These examples become even more striking when analyzed
in conjunction with the psychological research highlighted in Part II. As
previously discussed, there is research showing that many in the United
States subscribe to an individualistic, hierarchical worldview that makes
them highly skeptical of government regulation of industry.192 The public
relations team for R.J. Reynolds recognized the salience of a freedom of
choice frame more than forty years ago.193 The tobacco industry’s use of
a freedom of choice frame supported its arguments that smoking was an
issue about personal responsibility.194 When public health problems are
framed in terms of personal responsibility, it signals “that those who
suffer the consequences of consuming certain risky products, such as
smokers, are to blame for their injuries and that it is not the role of social
institutions such as the government to intervene and protect them.”195
Thus, in the public’s mind, the onus for action to reduce smoking is
placed on individuals rather than on the government.
Some argue that this individual responsibility framing was critical
to the tobacco industry’s ability to evade legal liability in the first two
waves of tobacco litigation.196 Another scholar argues that the key to the
anti-tobacco movement’s regulatory victories was the reframing of the
debate about whether smoking was an individual problem or a systemic
public health issue.197 This reframing was catalyzed by research on the
pervasive dangers of second-hand smoke.198 Such research supported a
systemic, public health framing because it demonstrated that “the risks of
smoking were acquired involuntarily by nonsmokers; potentially extended
to everyone rather than just to smokers; and arose from a smoke-filled envi-
ronment, not just from private, individual choice.”199 As will be discussed
later, some climate advocates draw from the anti-tobacco movement’s suc-
cess in an attempt to reframe the public debate around climate change.200
191 Id. at 14.
192 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 733.
193 See generally Issues and Answers, supra note 189 (framing the use of tobacco as an
issue involving freedom of choice).
194 Id.
195 Friedman et al., supra note 179, at 250.
196 See, e.g., id. at 250–51; Jess Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from
Tobacco Litigation to Obesity Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 82–83 (2006).
197 Regina G. Lawrence, Framing Obesity: The Evolution of News Discourse on a Public
Health Issue, 9 HARV. INT’L J. OF PRESS & POL. 56, 59 (2004).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 59–60.
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C. Framing and Obesity
Framing is also very important to the policy debate around obe-
sity in the United States. Scholars documented how the processed-food
industry borrowed many tactics from the tobacco industry, including its
emphasis on freedom of choice and individual responsibility frames.201 In
her article, Regina Lawrence argues that the policy debate around obesity
“will turn precisely on th[e] question of whether the body politic bears
some responsibility for the shape of individual American bodies.”202 If
obesity is defined as an individual rather than a systemic issue in public
discourse, it will undermine the government’s responsibility to address
the issue.203 Lawrence underscores time and again the profound impor-
tance frames have in shaping the scale and scope of policy interventions
in the United States.204 So, what are the specific features of a frame that
influence public perceptions of policy responses? Lawrence synthesizes
the work of different researchers to suggest four features of frames
critical to shaping the public’s perception of public health risks:
Research by Constance Nathanson identifies three key di-
mensions of how public health risks are framed that influ-
ence public policy responses: whether the health risk is
portrayed as “acquired deliberately or involuntarily (and the
victim correspondingly as culpable or innocent)”; whether
it is portrayed as “universal (putting us all at risk) or as par-
ticular (only putting them at risk)”; and whether it is por-
trayed as “arising from within the individual or from the
environment.” A fourth reframing dimension emerges in
Nathanson’s research, along with Stone’s work on other pub-
lic policy debates: Once a health risk is accepted as “real,”
whether that danger was knowingly or intentionally cre-
ated by others is often crucial to assigning blame. The more
an issue is framed in terms of involuntary risk, universal
risk, environmental risk, and knowingly created risk, the
201 Kelly D. Brownell & Kenneth E. Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco
Played Dirty and Millions Died. How similar is Big Food?, 87 MILBANK Q. 259, 263–65
(2009).
202 Lawrence, supra note 197, at 57.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 61–64 (describing competing ways of framing the obesity issue).
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more likely the opinion environment is to be conducive to
public policy solutions that burden powerful groups.205
These four features of a public health risk are conducive to creat-
ing a compelling climate change narrative. It is easy to see how climate
change can be framed as a universal and an environmental risk. It is also
possible to think of climate frames that would leverage the other two
dimensions, involuntary risk and knowingly created risk. Indeed, several
of the litigants discussed in Part IV draw from either one or both of those
dimensions in framing the threat of climate change.
D. Climate Change Frames
Frames have a structuring effect on social movements. They can
act as “a tool to strategically reach out to a broader audience, build co-
alitions, and shape personal behavior.”206 Many different frames have
been used in an attempt to shape public discourse around climate change,
including national security, public health, economic, environmental, and
moral frames.207 Several of these frames, described in the previous Part
exemplify strategies to overcome cognitive hurdles associated with the
public’s perception of climate change. Although I will not examine each
of these frames in depth, others focus explicitly on the successes and fail-
ures of the myriad climate frames used in the United States.208 Osofsky
and Peel describe the two profoundly conflicting climate change frames
with the most prominence in the United States.209 The first frame, often
used by Republicans or conservatives, underscores “scientific uncertainty,
dire economic consequences associated with climate action, and the unfair-
ness of U.S. citizens being required to take action if other countries such
as China and India do not.”210 The second frame, often used by Demo-
crats and liberals, paints climate change as a calamitous environmental
phenomenon.211 These incompatible frames can entrench partisan differ-
ences and make it impossible to reach any kind of consensus.
205 Id. at 59 (endnotes omitted).
206 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 722.
207 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153.
208 See, e.g., Mauro Bertolotti & Patrizia Catellani, Effects of message framing in policy
communication on climate change, 44 EUR. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 474 (2014).
209 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 721.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 721–22.
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1. Successful Frames
Osofsky and Peel describe two frames that have the potential to
bypass these deeply partisan climate change narratives and build con-
sensus between polarized groups.212 These frames center on economic
opportunity and disaster resilience.213 The U.S. public cares intensely
about jobs and the economy.214 Thus, it is no surprise that climate change
is often framed in economic terms, with both the left and the right making
an economic case for or against action on climate change.215 As a counter
to the message that climate change action will undermine the American
economy, some have stressed the economic opportunities presented by a
transition to renewable energy. One example of this framing comes from
former EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy, who in a 2014 speech empha-
sized “climate action could propel economic growth and ‘that U.S. states
that are still skeptical, like Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas,
would actually see an annual net economic benefit of up to about $16
billion dollars.’ ”216 Osofsky and Peel argue that this economic framing
can resonate.217 After examining several case studies to understand when
an economic framing is most effective at winning bipartisan support for
transitioning to renewable energy, Osofsky and Peel found three factors
that made such framing successful: “First, the economic benefits are real,
tangible, and significant. Second, the transitional steps are cost-effective
and easy to implement. Third, an established or growing industry sees
a profit opportunity that aligns with goals of the environmental and
labor coalitions.”218 A key insight that can be drawn from these findings
is that frames do not work in a vacuum. Climate advocates cannot just
adopt an economic frame, arguing that climate mitigation actions will be
good for the economy, without real-world evidence to back up their nar-
rative. Another insight is the importance of broadening the coalition of
stakeholders willing to support a particular frame. According to Osofsky
and Peel’s third factor, when industry members, environmentalists, and
labor organizations all find common ground, an economic framing for re-
newable energy becomes more effective.219
212 Id. at 702.
213 Id. at 724.
214 Id. at 725.
215 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 726–27.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 732.
218 Id. at 729.
219 Id. at 729–35 (discussing how industry members, environmentalists, and labor
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Another frame that might have success at bridging partisan divides
over climate change is one centered on disaster resilience. Drawing from
the case study of the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, Osofsky and Peel write
that “a key to adaptation planning may be to frame action in terms of dis-
aster resilience and response rather than climate change itself.”220 They
argue that disasters can “open windows for policy action—either directly
or through forcing litigation—by highlighting the very real and devastat-
ing effects on people’s homes, property, lives, and livelihoods that climate
change is likely to bring about.”221 Another interesting thing about severe
weather events is that their occurrence can catalyze the creation of new
coalitions. For example, insurance companies have a vested interest in
limiting their losses from disasters precipitated by a changing climate.222
As mentioned above, frames appear to be most effective when supported
by a broad coalition of stakeholders. How else can climate advocates use
frames most effectively? Below I will discuss several factors that can make
new frames of climate change resonate more deeply with audiences.
2. How Frames Can Be Deployed Most Effectively
Employing a different substantive frame than the status quo
frame is an important first step in communicating, but there are several
factors that make a substantive reframing effort more likely to succeed
with the public. One critical aspect to remember is that, as previously
discussed, framing operates at both the media level and the individual
level. New or different media frames of an issue will only be salient if
they are compatible with the public’s individual level frames. As Osofsky
and Peel explain, “people are only likely to accept an alternative way of
framing ‘if it is relevant—or applicable—to the audience’s preexisting
interpretations.’ ”223 This is why climate advocates strive to frame climate
change as a national security issue to convince conservative individuals
to believe in and care about climate change; it appeals to existing individ-
ual frames of the world.224
organizations have been able to find common ground by framing climate changes as
economic issues).
220 Id. at 737.
221 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 747.
222 Id. at 787.
223 Id. at 721.
224 Id. at 736–37 (suggesting that framing climate change as an issue linked to natural
disasters, which threaten national security, is a way to overcome partisan divides).
764 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:733
Another factor that can make frames more effective is the style of
their deployment. Who communicates a frame and how it is communi-
cated can be as important as the frame itself. Those studying climate
change communications “are increasingly finding that factors like whether
communicators use a friendly tone, display respect for and openness to
different views, and work to establish trust are key to effective communi-
cation of climate risks.”225 Additionally, researchers are finding that the
identity of those communicating climate frames can be deeply significant
to the reception of those frames.226 Research revealed the importance of
vouchers—“knowledgeable and trusted members of a person’s cultural
group who can help to build acceptance of a particular issue through
‘vouching’ for information and showing how it fits with the group’s pre-
existing worldview.”227 In the context of climate change litigation, plain-
tiffs could serve the role of vouchers communicating a climate change
frame to a specific community. The relationship between plaintiffs and
framing will be discussed further in the next Part. The key takeaway
here is that there are many factors that can make climate change frames
more or less salient to various audiences and effective climate change
communication is deeply nuanced and complex.
Obviously, climate advocates are not the only ones attempting to
frame the public’s perception of climate change. Various other powerful
groups and institutions try to shape the debate around climate change
in a way that benefits their own interests. These frames often profoundly
conflict with the frames offered by climate advocates. In the following
section I will provide an example of one of these emerging climate change
frames—freedom of speech.
3. Freedom of Speech Frame
The previous examples of the public debates over obesity and
smoking demonstrate the salience of personal freedom as a message in
the United States. Both the tobacco and processed-food industries under-
stood that freedom is a deeply compelling preexisting frame for the U.S.
public, and shaped their messaging strategies accordingly. In the climate
change context, Exxon Mobil (“Exxon”) and other political and media
actors began using an explicit freedom frame. Below I will describe how
climate advocates attempt to frame the threats of climate change and
how Exxon responded with its own framing of the public debate.
225 Id. at 723.
226 Id. at 723–24.
227 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 714.
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In 2015, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
issued a subpoena to Exxon in relation to an investigation into whether
the company misled the public and its shareholders regarding the risks
of climate change.228 Several other state attorneys general began their
own investigations into Exxon.229 In 2016, a coalition of state attorneys
general, calling themselves the “AGs United for Clean Power,” held a
press conference touting the various actions they would take to support
federal climate mitigation efforts.230 One of the group’s announced legal
strategies was to support joint investigations into whether the communi-
cations of the fossil fuel industry, and industry groups, misled citizens
about the risks of climate change.231 A close ally of the AGs United for
Clean Power, Former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, framed the group’s
tactics in the following terms: “What these attorneys general are doing
is extremely important. These brave members of this coalition are doing
their job like they did in the tobacco case.”232 Vice President Gore was
“comparing fossil fuel companies to the tobacco companies of the 1990s
that fell under intense scrutiny over misstatements about cancer and
heart disease risks associated with cigarette smoking.”233 Several other
prominent groups and individuals attempted to frame the fossil fuel
industry’s role in casting doubt on climate science as analogous to the
tobacco industry’s collusion and deception about the risks of smoking.234
These include Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who wrote a 2015 op-ed in
228 Bob Simison, New York Attorney General Subpoenas Exxon on Climate Research, IN-
SIDECLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/05112015/new
-york-attorney-general-eric-schneiderman-subpoena-Exxon-climate-documents [https://
perma.cc/Y5WK-L7QB].
229 John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fights Back at State Inquiries into Climate Change
Research, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/science/exxon
-mobil-fights-back-at-state-inquiries-into-climate-change-research.html [https://web
.archive.org/web/*/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/science/exxon-mobil-fights-back
-at-state-inquiries-into-climate-change-research.html].
230 THE CLIMATE REALITY PROJECT, Al Gore and New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman Launch AGs United For Clean Power Coalition (Mar. 30, 2016), https://
www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/al-gore-and-new-york-attorney-general-eric
-schneiderman-launch-ags-united-clean-power-coalition [https://perma.cc/5333-T3TZ].
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS & CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INST., ES-
TABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGES: LESSONS FROM TOBACCO
CONTROL 5–6 (2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/04/establish
ing-accountability-climate-change-damages-lessons-tobacco-control.pdf [https://perma
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which he said “[t]he parallels between what the tobacco industry did and
what the fossil fuel industry is doing now are striking.”235
As discussed above, one of the key factors in how the public
responds to a public health risk is whether it perceives that risk to be
knowingly created. In describing the actions of the fossil fuel industry as
analogous to those of the tobacco industry, climate advocates frame the
risks of climate change as intentionally created by the fossil fuel indus-
try. They also attempt to focus blame and responsibility for the risks of
climate change on the fossil fuel industry. As the examples of the policy
discussions around obesity and smoking demonstrated, who is held
responsible for a risk is critical to how the government and others will
respond to that risk. However, this framing by climate advocates does
not exist in a vacuum; Exxon and other political and media actors use a
competing frame to describe the actions of the AGs United for Clean
Power and their allies.236
Exxon and other political and media actors use a freedom of speech
frame to counter the framing by organizations like the AGs United for
Clean Power. After the Office of Massachusetts State Attorney General
Maura Healey issued a subpoena to Exxon in April 2016,237 Exxon sued
Healey in federal district court in Texas.238 In court documents, Exxon
alleged that Healey’s actions infringe on its First Amendment freedom
of speech rights and are an “effort to silence, intimidate, and deter those
possessing a particular viewpoint from participating in [the climate
policy] debate.”239 Exxon uses this narrative framing in other legal
documents, website content, press releases, and social media. For exam-
ple, Exxon links to articles from its corporate website like one from The
Daily Caller entitled, “Dangerous Double Standards on Climate Change
235 Sheldon Whitehouse, The fossil-fuel industry’s campaign to mislead the American
people, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), https://washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-fossil-fuel
-industrys-campaign-to-mislead-the-american-people/2015/05/29/04a2c448-0574-11e5
-8bda-c7b4e9a8f7ac_story.html?utm_term=.767ac2629071 [https://perma.cc/54BK-DZJ5].
236 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS & CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INST., supra note 234,
at 27–28.
237 Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36 from The Commw. of Mass. Office of the
Att’y Gen., to Exxon Mobil Corp. (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/docu
ments/2862196-Exxon-Subpoena-Massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/NU9M-K28X].
238 David Hasemyer, Exxon Sues a Second Attorney General To Fight Off Climate Fraud
Probe, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (June 16, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/1606
2016/exxon-sues-massachusetts-attorney-general-climate-change-fraud-investigation
[https://perma.cc/R9PH-UMDT].
239 ExxonMobil’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 87, Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-cv-00469-Y (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2016).
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and Free Speech.”240 Other articles linked to include “Exxon Mobil has a
Right to Its Opinion,” and “Consumer Protection: Not a Bully’s Weapon
on Free Speech.”241
After the AGs United For Clean Power coalition held its press
conference, Exxon issued a press release, saying: “The allegations re-
peated today are an attempt to limit free speech.”242 Exxon also tweeted:
“State AG allegations against [Exxon Mobil] are assault on free speech
and scientific inquiry.”243 Journalists Paul Barrett and Matthew Philips
detailed how Exxon used the freedom of speech frame to paint itself as
a victim and how the news media and then politicians quickly picked up
on the frame.244 They highlight that:
[T]he Washington Post carried two opinion pieces on the
topic: a column by George Will headlined “Scientific
Silencers on the Left Are Trying to Shut Down Climate
Skepticism” and one by Sam Kazman and Kent Lassman,
respectively general counsel and president of the Competi-
tive Enterprise Institute, condemning “the environmental
campaign that punishes free speech.” In the following
days, dozens of similar broadsides were issued from the
Wall Street Journal editorial page, Fox News, the Heri-
tage Foundation, and many others.245
Politicians also used the freedom of speech frame, labeling the
actions of the AGs United for Clean Power and their allies as an attack
on free speech. A group of state attorneys general wrote an open letter
denouncing the investigations into Exxon, saying they infringed upon the
240 EXXON MOBIL CORP., Understanding the #ExxonKnew “controversy,” http://www.exxon
mobil.eu/en-eu/policy/global-issues/climate/understanding-the-exxonknew-controversy
[https://perma.cc/24JG-XMMS].
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242 Suzanne McCarron, ExxonMobil Vice President of Pub. and Gov. Aff., ExxonMobil
responds to state AGs (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.ExxonMobilperspectives.com/2016/03
/29/ExxonMobil-responds-to-state-ags/?sf23338395=1 [https://perma.cc/X8QM-QNVZ].
243 Ben Jervey, State Investigations Into What Exxon Knew Double, and Exxon Gets De-
fensive, DESMOG BLOG (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.desmogblog.com/2016/04/01/more-state
-attorneys-general-investigate-exxon-exxon-gets-defensive [https://perma.cc/P6P2-3A2Z].
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freedom of speech rights of climate skeptics.246 Representative Lamar
Smith of Texas, chair of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy of the U.S. House of Representatives, wrote to Attorney General
Schneiderman declaring that the Committee would be conducting over-
sight of the actions of Schneiderman and the coalition of attorneys general
concerned about mitigating climate change.247 In his letter, Representa-
tive Smith described the coalition’s actions as “a coordinated attempt to
attack the First Amendment rights of American citizens and their ability
to fund and conduct scientific research free from intimidation and threats
of prosecution.”248
Thus, there is evidence that Exxon Mobil, political elites, and mem-
bers of the media are using a freedom of speech frame to describe investi-
gations into whether or not Exxon Mobil misled the public about the
threat of climate change. This media frame can be expected to resonate
with the American public, given the salience of individual freedom in the
United States. The example underscores that any frames climate advo-
cates attempt to deploy to reframe the public discourse around the
dangers of climate change will not exist in a vacuum. The AGs United for
Clean Power are attempting to reframe the climate change discourse,
shifting accountability for the dangers of climate change to industry and
arguing that some of those dangers were knowingly created. But that
frame has to compete with the profoundly conflicting frame offered by
Exxon Mobil and others in politics and the media.
Such conflicting frames parallel the dynamics of litigation, where
each side is attempting to tell the most persuasive story, in the courtroom
and in the public sphere. In the next Part, I will draw on the insights from
framing theory and psychological research to analyze how climate litigants
can tell the most compelling story, even in the face of conflicting messaging.
IV. ANALYSIS OF TOPICAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
As discussed in Part I, the number of climate change lawsuits has
ballooned in the last decade. Those suing to advance climate change
246 Letter from Luther Strange, Ala. Att’y Gen., to Fellow Att’ys Gen. (June 15, 2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2862197/AG-Coalition-Resp-Letter-2016-06
-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8RL-RKJL].
247 Letter from the H.R. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech. to Eric Schneiderman, Att’y
Gen. of N.Y. 1 (May 18, 2016), https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house
.gov /files/documents/06.17.2016%20SST%20Letter%20to%20AG%20Schneiderman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7LG-C9T5].
248 Id. at 4.
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regulation and those suing to halt or prevent climate change regulation
are both adopting new legal strategies. Although it is beyond the scope
of this Article to document all of the new legal strategies being employed
in these lawsuits, below I will describe and analyze three topical legal
strategies being used by climate advocates. I will focus on the strategies
of pro-regulatory climate litigants, and I will discuss how opposing groups
have responded to those litigants. I have chosen to analyze litigation strat-
egies that I think present an opportunity of overcoming the public’s
psychological hurdles to engaging with climate change and offer a narra-
tive on climate change that will resonate with the public. These three
litigation strategies include: (1) the Climate Law in our Hands campaign,
(2) atmospheric trust litigation initiated by Our Children’s Trust, and (3)
the climate necessity defense.
A. Climate Law in Our Hands
Climate Law in our Hands is a campaign initiated by West Coast
Environmental Law (“WCEL”), an environmental law organization operat-
ing out of Vancouver, British Columbia.249 I have described it as a cam-
paign rather than a lawsuit because, as of the writing of this Article, it has
not yet developed into a lawsuit. Climate Law in our Hands focuses on fos-
tering a social movement and community discussion around the fossil fuel
industry’s responsibility for the costs of climate change, but it also explic-
itly includes the potential for climate change litigation as one end goal of
the social movement.250 WCEL outlines three steps in its campaign, al-
though the steps do not necessarily have to be taken in order. The first step,
entitled, “Demand Accountability,” is for communities to send a letter or in-
voice to fossil fuel companies detailing the costs they will sustain from cli-
mate mitigation and adaption actions and requesting that those companies
recognize their role in generating those costs and “agree to pay [their] fair
share.”251 The Climate Law in our Hands campaign in British Columbia
“is asking 190 of the province’s local governments to send climate accounta-
bility letters to the world’s largest fossil fuel companies.”252 They highlight
249 About, W. COAST ENVTL. L., http://www.climatelawinourhands.org/wcel [https://perma
.cc/V39V-K9UA] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
250 Climate Law in our Hands in British Columbia, W. COAST ENVTL. L., http://climatelaw
inourhands.org/climatelawinourhandsbc/ [https://perma.cc/4M4K-DBM3] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2018).
251 Demand Accountability, W. COAST ENVTL. L., http://www.climatelawinourhands.org
/demand-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/89SP-JQJV] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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that this step takes little time or money for communities but it could have
important consequences: once fossil fuel companies have received these
letters demanding they pay their share of climate costs it “becomes a risk
that they arguably should be disclosing to their shareholders.”253
The second step in the campaign, entitled “Evaluate and Plan for
Climate Impacts,” is for communities to document and quantify all of the
costs they are sustaining to address the threats of climate change.254 This
step produces important evidence for step three, a class action against
fossil fuel companies.255 WCEL emphasizes that a class action is but one
of several strategies to demand accountability from fossil fuel companies
and it is not an inevitable step.256
On its website, the campaign lays out a publicly available road-
map of climate change litigation that could be launched if fossil fuel
companies do not agree to pay their fair share of community costs from
climate impacts.257 WCEL explains the decisions behind its proposed cli-
mate change litigation strategy—a nuisance class action brought by local
governments against fossil fuel companies to recoup community costs for
climate adaptation.258 WCEL suggests that local governments would be
ideal plaintiffs because “[t]hey incur direct climate-related costs in order
to perform their legal responsibilities and protect their citizens” and thus
have a strong argument that they have standing to bring suit.259 They sug-
gest suing in both public nuisance, for “unreasonable interference with
our common right to a healthy global atmosphere” and private nuisance,
for “unreasonable interference with the property of the local govern-
ments.”260 The suggestion that local governments should sue for costs
related to infrastructure adaptation was driven by WCEL’s recognition
of how difficult it has been for plaintiffs to prove causation in pro-regula-
tory climate change litigation.261 For example, in Native Village of Kivalina
v. Exxon Mobil Corp, Plaintiffs, “a self-governing, federally recognized
tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans,” sued a group of energy producers,
253 Id.
254 Climate Law in our Hands in British Columbia, supra note 250.
255 Id.
256 A BC class action against climate polluters, W. COAST ENVTL. L., http://www.climatelaw
inourhands.org/bcclassaction [https://perma.cc/QH5G-VZUS] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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including Exxon Mobil, in federal district court.262 The Plaintiffs alleged
that their village had been profoundly impacted by storms and erosion
caused by climate change and that the energy producers had substan-
tially contributed to climate change, causing injury to the Plaintiffs.263
The District Court held that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because
they could not establish that the energy producers’ actions had caused
their injury.264 In contrast to the fact patterns in cases like Kivalina,
climate adaption costs are being incurred by communities in the present
and the costs are already explicitly linked to climate change. WCEL argues
that this should make it easier for local governments to prove causation
in their potential nuisance class action.265
Finally, WCEL proposes that local governments should bring their
suit against fossil fuel companies. Drawing from research that traces
shares of global GHG emissions back to specific fossil fuel companies,
WCEL suggests that local governments focus on suing larger polluters.
In explaining this strategy, they write that:
5 companies (Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Saudi Aramco, British
Petroleum and Shell) are, according to precedent-setting
research, responsible for approximately 14% of historic
greenhouse gas emissions (from their direct emissions and
those of their products). We propose only claiming each
company’s fair share based on that percentage, limiting
their ability to add other companies as co-defendants.266
Although, it may seem like a daunting legal strategy to sue a group of the
biggest fossil fuel companies in the world, WCEL explains that one of the
reasons for suggesting a class action style lawsuit is that losing parties
do not have to pay the winning party’s legal fees under British Columbia’s
class action rules.267
1. Psychological Analysis
Many features of WCEL’s Climate Law in our Hands campaign
relate to the research in climate psychology and framing discussed in
262 Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 854.
265 A BC class action against climate polluters, supra note 256.
266 Id.
267 Id.
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Parts II and III. I will draw from the insights in those Parts to analyze
the Climate Law in our Hands campaign, as well as the counter-narra-
tives offered by industry and citizen groups. I will begin by analyzing the
campaign through a climate psychology lens, evaluating characteristics
of the campaign in light of the insights from each of the relevant bodies
of literature discussed in Part II: the cognitive hurdles to addressing
tragedies of the commons, the features of laypeople’s risk assessment,
and activating moral intuition on climate change. Then I will evaluate
the frames used by the campaign in light of the insights from framing
theory highlighted in Part III.
In his analysis of how to overcome the cognitive hurdles preventing
people from addressing tragedies of the commons—like climate change—
Thompson suggests that lawsuits can help resource users acknowledge
they have a problem and strategize for how to address the problem.268 The
Climate Law in our Hands campaign is ideally suited to serving these pur-
poses. The key goal of the initiative “is to start a much-needed conversa-
tion about the fossil fuel industry’s responsibility to pay for the harm their
products are causing to communities around the world.”269 It is facilitat-
ing community discussion around how the problem of climate change
should be addressed. WCEL has partnered with organizations in British
Columbia to ask local governments to demand accountability from fossil
fuel companies via letter or invoice and to consider joining a class action
against such companies.270 As the campaign is currently structured, a
class action will only proceed if a sufficient number of citizens pressure
their local governments to launch such a lawsuit; thus community input
and support is necessary for the campaign to even result in a lawsuit.
Two of the three key cognitive hurdles preventing the public from
successfully addressing tragedies of the commons like climate change are
uncertainty and individual discounting of future risks.271 Climate Law in
our Hands’ proposed class action is structured in such a way as to mini-
mize scientific and social uncertainty around the threat of climate change.
Climate change is a complex and nonlinear phenomenon, interacting with
many other scientific phenomena. This complexity can make it difficult
268 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 267.
269 Flex your local muscles and hold fossil fuel companies accountable!, W. COAST ENVTL.
L. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.wcel.org/blog/flex-your-local-muscles-and-hold-fossil-fuel
-companies-accountable [https://perma.cc/P3BP-SPZH] [hereinafter Flex local muscles].
270 Joint sign-on letter to BC’s local governments, W. COAST ENVTL. L. (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.climatelawinourhands.org/a-challenge-to-bc-local-governments/ [https://perma
.cc/7CWX-9DAT].
271 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 274.
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to say that events like hurricanes or wildfires are definitively caused by
climate change. In the legal context, causation is critical to both estab-
lishing standing and to establishing a tort claim. As WCEL notes on its
website “ ‘causation’ [has often been] seen as a barrier to climate litiga-
tion.”272 In the United States, the causation prong of standing analysis has
frequently been an insurmountable bar for climate change litigants.273
Recognizing the barrier of causation, Climate Law in our Hands
has suggested that local governments sue for climate adaptation costs,
costs that “are incurred to prepare infrastructure and services to with-
stand changes in the climate over a 30–50+ year time-frame, based on
the best available climate science about how a region is changing.”274
Local governments are incurring these costs for the explicit purpose of
preparing for climate change, and thus they have a strong legal argu-
ment that the costs are caused by climate change. This legal strategy
aligns with Thompson’s suggestions for how to minimize uncertainty,
and for how to get resource users to overcome their discounting of future
risk and take tragedies of the commons seriously before the common
resource collapses. He proposes that communicators “focus on the current
drawbacks of an unconstrained commons.”275 By centering on the costs
communities are incurring now to prepare for future climate impacts,
Climate Law in our Hands focuses public attention on the current draw-
backs of climate change and makes it harder for the public to discount
the future impacts. It also might help minimize scientific uncertainty by
galvanizing communities to meticulously document the costs of expected
climate impacts and make those impacts tangible and salient to the public.
It is not just scientific uncertainty that hampers individuals’
ability to address collective action problems but social uncertainty as
well. The key message of Climate Law in our Hands is that fossil fuel
companies should have to pay their fair share of climate costs. As dis-
cussed in Part II, collective action problems engender social uncertainty
because people cannot agree on who should bear the burden of solving
such problems; there is no consensus on the fairest way to divide the
burden. Arguing that the fossil fuel industry should bear the burden of
addressing climate change could be a divisive message, especially given
272 A BC class action against climate polluters, supra note 256.
273 See, e.g., Corey Moffat, Establishing Causation in Private Party Climate Change Suits:
Correcting the Mistakes of Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 44 Envtl. L. 959,
964–66 (2014).
274 A BC class action against climate polluters, supra note 256.
275 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 274 (emphasis in original).
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research showing that people with hierarchical, individualistic worldviews
greatly value industry.276 By selecting industry members as the defen-
dants in their proposed class action lawsuit, Climate Law in our Hands
risks making individuals already skeptical of environmental risks more
doubtful of those risks. On the other hand, the Climate Law in our Hands
campaign’s core message is asking industry to pay its fair share of cli-
mate costs. This emphasis on fairly dividing the burden of climate adap-
tion costs, which would otherwise fall entirely on local taxpayers, could
generate buy-in from otherwise skeptical community members. Beyond
the substance of the campaign’s message, the manner of the campaign’s
communication of that message—through local discussion—is also aligned
with Thompson’s suggestions for overcoming cognitive hurdles to address-
ing climate change. He highlights the importance of community discus-
sion, writing that “studies suggest that once all the users of a commons
come together, start talking, and learn what others believe to be fair, they
adjust their own perceptions of fairness to a less biased opinion.”277
Part II discussed research about how profoundly important emotion,
heuristics, and cultural and ideological worldviews are to laypeople’s risk
assessment. This research explains how and why so many people have
trouble understanding and believing the dangers of climate change. One
way climate litigation could advance climate advocacy is by spurring more
people to believe in or recognize the dangers of climate change. As men-
tioned above, because the Climate Law in our Hands campaign centers on
the necessity of industry bearing responsibility for climate costs, it may
not overcome the cognitive hurdles of motivated reasoning. According to
the Expressive Utility Position, individuals predisposed to support in-
dustry can be unconsciously motivated to dismiss evidence that does not
fit with their support of industry.278
However, because the campaign focuses on the present costs of fu-
ture risks of climate change, it may make those future risks more salient
to the public. Laypeople often rely on System 1, heuristic-driven, infor-
mation processing which can cause them to underestimate the dangers
associated with “more remote, less gripping hazards such as climate
change.”279 By getting local communities to confront and discuss the
present costs of future risks, Climate Law in our Hands may help make
the dangers associated with climate change more visceral to the public.
276 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 733.
277 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 277.
278 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 733–34.
279 Kahan, supra note 108, at 408.
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As discussed in Part II, although moral intuition about an issue
can motivate action, it has been difficult to get the public to see climate
change through a moral lens. Scholars have identified several important
reasons why climate change does not activate the public’s moral intuition
and offered suggestions for how to do so. The Climate Law in our Hands
campaign has several features that might help the public view climate
change as a moral issue, thus motivating them to take action.
The Climate Law in our Hands campaign challenges the narrative
that climate change is the result of an unintentional action—a narrative
that makes it difficult to activate the public’s moral intuition about cli-
mate change. It argues that the fossil fuel industry is disproportionately
responsible, compared to average citizens, for the harms of climate change
and thus must shoulder its share of the costs. One effort of the campaign,
a 2017 letter signed by West Coast Environmental Law and more than
50 other organizations, describes the blameworthiness of the fossil fuel
industry in the following terms:
The fossil fuel industry is keen to avoid a conversation
about its responsibility for climate change. Just 90 enti-
ties—primarily fossil fuel companies—have caused almost
2/3 of human caused greenhouse gas emissions, and just
three—Chevron, Exxon Mobil and Saudi Aramco—are
responsible for almost 10%! Like the tobacco industry
before it, Big Oil relies on the perception that individual
consumers are responsible for climate change while pock-
eting billions of dollars in profits from products that they
know are disastrous for our atmosphere and communities
around the world.280
As Markowitz and Shariff noted, “recognizing a harmful event as the
product of an intentional agent . . . is a highly motivating cue for correc-
tive action.”281 The Climate Law in our Hands campaign focuses blame
for climate change, which is often diffuse and malleable, on a small
number of fossil fuel companies who have produced a large fraction of
anthropogenic GHGs. It underscores the blameworthiness of the actions
of the fossil fuel industry by comparing them to those of the tobacco
industry, saying that both profit from disaster. In another moral fram-
ing, the letter notes that the impacts of climate change are “still more
280 Joint sign-on letter to BC’s local governments, supra note 270.
281 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 244.
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challenging for vulnerable groups—the poor, Indigenous people, women
and children.”282 The campaign has another feature that might help it
activate the public’s moral intuition about climate change. One of the
cognitive hurdles that prevents climate change from being seen as a moral
issue is guilty bias.283 Climate change narratives that blame the public
for their individual choices can induce guilt and fear, which can make
people “engage in biased cognitive processes to minimize perceptions of
their own complicity.”284 The Climate Law in our Hand’s campaign is
tailor-made to avoid guilty bias, refocusing blame to those the campaign
sees as the much bigger culprits—fossil fuel companies. For example, here
is a paragraph from the campaign’s website:
Do you feel like you’re personally responsible for the cli-
mate crisis?
Much of the talk about climate change focuses on individ-
ual actions: how we heat and power our homes, how we
get around, what we buy and consume in our fossil
fuel–dependent world.
While we should all be concerned about the impacts of our
lifestyle, there’s a bigger picture as well. A small group of
very large companies has cashed in on our fossil fuel con-
sumption. Those companies have made hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars extracting, processing, marketing and
selling fossil fuels.285
This narrative seeks to minimize individual guilt while also emphasizing
that certain actors have intentionally contributed to and profited from
climate change.
Researchers have highlighted the importance of self-efficacy, the
“sense of being able to do anything about climate change,”286 to climate
change communications. Sometimes by highlighting the magnitude of the
282 Joint sign-on letter to BC’s local governments, supra note 270.
283 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 244.
284 Id.
285 Why demand accountability from fossil fuel companies?, W. COAST ENVTL. L., http://
www.climatelawinourhands.org/why-demand-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/A9GW
-PJ9V] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (emphasis in original).
286 Saffron J. O’Neill et al., On the use of imagery for climate change engagement, 23
GLOBAL ENVT’L CHANGE 413, 414 (2013).
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problem of climate change, communicators actually make people feel dis-
empowered to address it.287 The Climate Law in our Hands campaign
explicitly employs language of empowerment, telling the public that there
are simple, inexpensive steps to take to mitigate the dangers of climate
change. For example, here is a quote from the campaign’s website:
Our letter represents a first step in rejecting the power-
lessness that we all feel in relation to the climate crisis.
We are frightened of what climate change is doing to our
communities and to the communities of the world. But it
is not true that we can do nothing about it.288
2. Framing Analysis
Analyzing the Climate Law in Our Hands campaign through the
lens of the framing literature highlighted in Part III provides several
important insights. The first is that the campaign’s explicit attempt to
reframe the issue of climate change as being a systemic or corporate
issue rather than an individual one is a smart strategic move. Both the
tobacco and processed-food industries and their allies attempted to frame
the issues of smoking and obesity as individual problems rather than
systemic public health problems.289 As previously mentioned, when public
health issues are framed as individual problems it signals “that those
who suffer the consequences of consuming certain risky products . . . are
to blame for their injuries and it is not the role of social institutions” to
step in and confront the problem.290
Lawrence outlines factors that make a public health frame more
salient to the public, including whether the health risk is portrayed as
intentionally created.291 As discussed in the above climate psychology
analysis of the campaign, Climate Law in our Hands has framed climate
change as being intentionally created. The following line from the cam-
paign’s website underscores this message of intentionality: “The argu-
ment for [the fossil fuel industry’s] liability is particularly strong for the
period during which the companies knew that their products were caus-
ing climate change.”292
287 Id. at 419.
288 Flex local muscles, supra note 269.
289 See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 179; Brownell & Warner, supra note 201.
290 Friedman et al., supra note 179, at 250.
291 Lawrence, supra note 197, at 59.
292 A BC class action against climate polluters, supra note 256.
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Osofsky and Peel emphasize that the way a frame is communicated
can be just as important as the frame itself.293 Vouchers, “knowledgeable
and trusted members of a person’s cultural group,” are especially effec-
tive at communicating frames.294 By building a coalition of local commu-
nity groups to petition local governments to think about who should pay
for climate adaptation costs, the Climate Law in our Hands campaign is
drawing on locally known vouchers to frame its climate message. The
campaign recognizes how important these community vouchers and
discussions are, writing in its letter to local governments that:
[demanding fossil fuel accountability and working towards
a class action lawsuit], as well as a general public discus-
sion about the role of fossil fuels in our future economy,
are most likely to move forward if our communities under-
stand how we are being, and will be, impacted by climate
change. We urge you to work with your citizens, climate
scientists and other experts in a publicly transparent way
to explore what needs to be done to prepare your commu-
nity for climate change.”295
Osofsky and Peel underscore the centrality of economics in the
framing of climate change.296 While the Climate Law in our Hands cam-
paign has its own economic framing of climate change, that it is unfair
for “taxpayers alone to foot the bill,”297 it is possible to see how other
groups might reframe action on climate change and the campaign as
producing “dire economic consequences.”298 Indeed, as will be discussed
below, one group has already used this frame in response to Climate Law
in our Hands.
Finally, as Osofsky and Peel noted, one frame that might have
bipartisan appeal is disaster resilience.299 They recommend framing
adaptation steps “in terms of disaster resilience and response rather
than climate change itself.”300 Osofsky and Peel are suggesting communi-
cation techniques for an American audience, and Climate Law in our
293 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 723.
294 Id. at 714.
295 Joint sign-on letter to BC’s local governments, supra note 270.
296 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 721.
297 Why demand accountability from fossil fuel companies?, supra note 285.
298 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 721.
299 Id. at 724.
300 Id. at 737.
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Hands is currently focused in Canada, but it may be helpful to the
campaign to focus even more on disaster resilience to build support for
climate action.
As previously mentioned, pro-regulatory climate frames never
exist in a vacuum. Below I will detail how a citizen group and an indus-
try member have pushed back against the narrative that the fossil fuel
industry should pay its fair share of climate costs.
Friends of Science Society (“the Society”), “an independent group
of earth, atmospheric and solar scientists, engineers, and citizens” who
believe “the sun is the main driver of climate change, not carbon dioxide
(CO2),”301 responded to the Climate Law in our Hands campaign with
several counter-narratives in a 2017 press release. First, they challenge
WCEL and others who have signed onto the Climate Law in our Hands
campaign to “walk-the-walk” and give up using fossil fuels immedi-
ately.302 They also use an economic argument, pointing to all the ways
fossil fuels are being used in British Columbia, including to power air-
ports, shipping ports, and ferries, and argue that oil and gas are a
“saving grace.”303 Finally they highlight a blog post describing “how the
sudden loss of fossil fuels to the mainland, so desired by the ‘green’ anti-
oil activists, would result in a ‘Zombie Apocalypse’ of social anarchy and
chaos within days.”304 There are three key ways the Friends of Science
Society is trying to reframe the narrative offered by Climate Law in our
Hands. While WCEL has been presenting the campaign as being about
community empowerment and asking fossil fuel companies to pay their
fair share of the costs of climate impacts, the Society is attempting to
reframe the campaign as being grounded in hypocrisy. Essentially, they
argue that if WCEL and these other organizations think fossil fuels are
such a problem, they should cease personal use of them immediately.
They also use an economic frame, arguing that communities will be
financially imperiled if they stop using fossil fuels, paralleling a common
climate frame used in the United States. They also attempt to reframe
the campaign as being about forcing the immediate end of fossil fuels in
British Columbia, by pointing to a blog post that predicted social anarchy
if fossil fuels were immediately phased out of use in the province.
301 Friends of Science Society calls on West Coast Environmental Law to Walk the Talk on
Climate Change and Fossil Fuel Phase-out and Go Without, PRWEB (Feb. 8, 2017), http://
www.prweb.com/releases/2017/02/prweb14053101.htm [https://perma.cc/HPL8-2GB8].
302 Id.
303 Id.
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Suncor Energy, a Canadian energy company with a heavy stake
in Canada’s tar sands, has pushed back against the suggestion that fossil
fuel companies should pay their fair share of climate costs. In a company
blog post entitled, “What to do when everyone is the problem,” Suncor
argues that the fossil fuel industry should not be singled out for blame for
the dangers of climate change.305 The post is not written in direct re-
sponse to the Climate Law in our Hands Campaign, but it does reference
a report exploring the legal liability of Canadian fossil fuel companies in
relation to climate change.306 Suncor writes: “The hard, undeniable truth
is that all of us, as fortunate members of the developed world, are
complicit when it comes to GHG emissions.”307 The blog drives home this
message of individual responsibility for climate change, writing: “Think-
ing of one self as a polluter is unappealing and hard on the ego. But so
should be the thought of inaction, given our climate change challenge
and the tough choices we’re facing as we seek a path to a more sustain-
able energy.”308
WCEL’s Climate Law in our Hands’ framing of the causes and
consequences of climate change is diametrically opposed to the framing
offered by Suncor. In explaining the importance of its campaign, WCEL
emphasizes that it is industry action and not individual action that is
disproportionately responsible for the dangers of climate change. As dis-
cussed above, when people feel guilty about climate change, they subcon-
sciously work to minimize the threat of climate change in an effort to
lessen their guilt. Suncor’s framing emphatically singles out individuals
as being responsible for creating the dangers of climate change.
B. Our Children’s Trust
The U.S. non-profit Our Children’s Trust has been filing some of
the most cutting edge climate change litigation in recent years. The organi-
zation has launched or supported lawsuits based in state law across the
United States; their legal strategy centers on “secur[ing] the legal right
to a stable climate and healthy atmosphere.”309 They also partner with
305 What to do when everyone is the problem, OIL SANDS QUESTION AND RESPONSE (Oct. 30,
2014), http://osqar.suncor.com/2014/10/what-to-do-when-everyone-is-the-problem.html
[https://perma.cc/J98B-M77Q].
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 State Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/state
-legal-actions/ [https://perma.cc/3GU2-VY62] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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youth and attorneys around the world to help advance climate change
lawsuits in other jurisdictions.310 Our Children’s Trust has also created
a program, called Youth Climate Action Now, that “trains and supports
youth, their families, and other supporters to engage in civic participa-
tion with local government.”311 Finally, Our Children’s Trust has supported
a climate change lawsuit at the federal level, Juliana v. U.S., which will
be the focus of my analysis.
1. Juliana v. U.S.
In August 2015, twenty-one youths, along with prominent climate
scientist Dr. James E. Hansen and the non-profit Earth Guardians, filed
a lawsuit against the U.S. government in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon.312 The Plaintiffs presented four claims for relief,
alleging that the U.S. government has acted in 1) “violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment”; 2) “violation of equal protection
principles embedded in the Fifth Amendment”; 3) violation of “the un-
enumerated rights preserved for the people by the Ninth Amendment”;
and 4) “violation of the public trust doctrine.”313 I will discuss each claim
in turn below.
a. Plaintiffs’ Claims
Claim 1: Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “no
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”314 In their complaint the Plaintiffs allege that their:
310 Global Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/global
-legal-actions/ [https://perma.cc/46LC-9SGJ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
311 Grassroots Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org
/grassroots-legal-actions/ [https://perma.cc/Y3MR-NMQW] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
312 Press Release, Our Children’s Trust & Earth Guardians, America’s Youth File Land-
mark Climate Lawsuit Against U.S. Government and President (Aug. 12, 2015), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/575adceb4c2f8523de7286a2
/1465572588513/15.08.12FederalClimateLawsuitPressRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/868X
-ZMZX] [hereinafter Youth File Climate Lawsuit].
313 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 277–310, Juliana v.
U.S., No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/575add014c2f8523de728730/1465572614596/YouthAmend
edComplaintAgainstUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6CM-V72S] [hereinafter Youth Complaint].
314 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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substantive Fifth Amendment rights have been infringed
because Defendants directly caused atmospheric CO2 to
rise to levels that dangerously interfere with a stable cli-
mate system required alike by our nation and Plaintiffs. The
present CO2 concentration and continuing CO2 emissions—
a function, in substantial part, of Defendants’ historic and
continuing permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing of fossil
fuel extraction, production, transportation, and utiliza-
tion—endangers Plaintiffs’ lives, liberties, and property.315
Essentially, the Plaintiffs argue that, despite knowing how dan-
gerous climate change could be to its citizens, the U.S. government has
allowed and encouraged the development and use of fossil fuels, and the
ensuing scale of GHG emissions from such use and development threat-
ens the life, liberty, and property of the Plaintiffs. They argue that Amer-
ica’s “climate system including the atmosphere and oceans, is critical to
Plaintiffs’ rights to life, liberty, and property.”316 Throughout the com-
plaint, the Plaintiffs underscore that the U.S. government both knew about
the dangers of climate change and that they knowingly helped contribute
to the dangers of climate change. For example, they write: “For the past
fifty years, Defendants have known about the danger to Plaintiffs’ safety
created by carbon pollution. Acting with full appreciation of the conse-
quences of their acts, Defendants knowingly caused, and continue to cause,
dangerous interference with our atmosphere and climate system.”317
Claim 2: Violation of Equal Protection Principles Embedded in the Fifth
Amendment
In their second claim for relief, the Plaintiffs argue that the Court
should treat youth and future generations as suspect classes under an
equal protection analysis, and that both youth and future generations
have had their fundamental rights violated by the U.S. government. To
support their argument that they should be treated as suspect classes,
the Plaintiffs argue that:
Defendants have a long history of deliberately discriminat-
ing against children and future generations in exerting
315 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶ 279.
316 Id.
317 Id. ¶ 280.
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their sovereign authority over our nation’s air space and fed-
eral fossil fuel resources for the economic benefit of present
generations of adults. Plaintiffs are an insular minority
with no voting rights and little, if any, political power or
influence over Defendants and their actions concerning
fossil fuels. Plaintiffs have immutable age characteristics
that they cannot change.318
In making out their claim, the Plaintiffs argue that laws that dis-
criminate against youth and future generations should trigger strict
scrutiny from the court.319 They provide an example of a discriminatory law,
the Energy Policy Act, and explain why they believe it is discriminatory:
The Energy Policy Act’s mandatory authorization for export
and import of natural gas discriminates against Plaintiffs
by exacerbating already-dangerous levels of atmospheric
CO2 and a dangerous climate system, the consequences of
which will be irreversible and catastrophic in Plaintiffs’ life-
times. The Energy Policy Act, section 201, creates a dispro-
portionate impact on suspect classes. Historical evidence
demonstrates Defendants’ discriminatory and intentional
acts against children and future generations in order to
foster the short-term economic and energy interests of other
classes, including corporations. The Energy Policy Act un-
constitutionally deprives minor children and future gener-
ations of equal protection of the law because the full impacts
of excess atmospheric CO2 and the dangerous climate
system, resulting from the U.S. government–authorized
natural gas exports and imports, will be disproportion-
ately imposed upon minor children, including Youth Plain-
tiffs, and for millennia by future generations.320
Claim 3: The Unenumerated Rights Preserved for the People by the
Ninth Amendment
In claim 3, the Plaintiffs argue that the dangers of climate change
threaten both liberty and justice in the United States.321 They contend
318 Id. ¶ 294.
319 Id. ¶¶ 293–97.
320 Id. ¶ 299.
321 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶ 303.
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that one of “the implicit liberties protected from government intrusion by
the Ninth Amendment is the right to be sustained by our country’s vital
natural systems, including our climate system.”322 Obviously the Consti-
tution does not explicitly mention climate change, as the threat of climate
change was unknown when the Constitution was written. The Plaintiffs
argue here that protecting the United States from dangerous climate
change is fundamental to safeguarding other rights that are explicitly
protected by the Constitution.
Claim 4: Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
In their fourth and final claim, the Plaintiffs argue that under the
public trust doctrine, the U.S. government is a sovereign trustee of the
US’s natural resources, which are essential to the well-being of U.S.
citizens. Accordingly, the government has a duty to keep from substan-
tially impairing those resources.323 The Plaintiffs expound on the public
trust doctrine:
Plaintiffs are beneficiaries of rights under the public trust
doctrine, rights that are secured by the Ninth Amendment
and embodied in the reserved powers doctrines of the
Tenth Amendment and the Vesting, Nobility, and Poster-
ity Clauses of the Constitution. These rights protect the
rights of present and future generations to those essential
natural resources that are of public concern to the citizens
of our nation. These vital natural resources include at
least the air (atmosphere), water, seas, the shores of the
sea, and wildlife. The overarching public trust resource is
our country’s life-sustaining climate system, which encom-
passes our atmosphere, waters, oceans, and biosphere.
Defendants must take affirmative steps to protect those
trust resources.324
The Plaintiffs contend that by supporting, subsidizing, and approving
fossil fuel production and use in the United States, the government has
failed in its duty as sovereign trustee.325
322 Id.
323 Id. ¶¶ 308–09.
324 Id. ¶ 308.
325 Id. ¶ 310.
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Beyond the complaint itself, the press release accompanying the
initial filing of the complaint in Juliana v. U.S. offers significant insights
into the narrative the Plaintiffs and Our Children’s Trust are trying to com-
municate to the American public. One of the most significant aspects of
the press release is its focus on the diverse stories of the young Plaintiffs:
Youth Plaintiff Tia Hatton, from Bend, OR, has experienced
record low snowfall for the past three years, threatening
her water supplies and winter sports. She knows carbon
pollution confronts her and her generation with the spec-
ter of severe water shortages, and is concerned she will be
forced to stop skiing competitively. Levi Draheim, an 8-
year-old Plaintiff from Indialantic, FL lives with his fam-
ily on a small barrier island between the Atlantic ocean
and a lagoon. Sea level rise is already seriously impacting
their island, and Levi is worried he will have to move if it
becomes worse. Plaintiff Journey Zephier, a 15-year-old who
lives in Kaua’i, Hawai’i, is watching the island’s beaches
erode away. The island’s decreased rainfall is resulting in
lower river water levels, and his community is faced with
serious water quality problems because saltwater is in-
truding upriver from sea level rise.326
b. Government and Industry Response
In its motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the U.S. govern-
ment argued that the Plaintiffs had no standing, that their injuries were
too generalized, and that the Court would be forced to wade far into
policy-making to address the Plaintiffs claims.327 This Article focuses on
how litigation can best communicate the dangers of climate change in the
court and in the public sphere and thus I am discussing and analyzing
legal claims for their narrative salience rather than their legal merit.
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. government argues that the Plaintiffs do not
have standing to bring their suit. The government presents two arguments
that have hindered climate change lawsuits in the past—that the causal
326 Youth File Climate Lawsuit, supra note 312, at 2.
327 Fed. Defs.’ Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss at 1,
Juliana v. U.S., No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015), https://static1.squarespace
.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576195bd2fe1316f09d2ef81/1466013119008/15
.11.17.Fed+MTD+Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HB2-554N].
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chain alleged by the Plaintiffs is too attenuated and that the Plaintiffs’
grievances are better addressed by the political branch rather than the
judicial branch. As previously mentioned, causation has often been a
stumbling block in climate change litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
test for standing requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate:
(1) an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized”
and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”;
(2) that their injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the “independ-
ent action of some third party not before the court”; and (3)
that it is “ ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative’ that
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ”328
In its motion to dismiss, the U.S. government argues that the Plaintiffs
have not established a sufficient causal chain between their alleged
injury and the U.S. government’s actions.329
The U.S. government also argues that the Plaintiffs do not have
standing because their injuries are not redressable by the Court. They
write:
Plaintiffs seek a comprehensive national climate policy,
overseen by a single federal district court, that would re-
quire wholesale changes to energy production and con-
sumption in this country . . . Formulating and enforcing
this expansive relief lies outside this Court’s competence
and jurisdiction.330
The National Association for Manufacturers, the American Fuel
& Petrochemical Manufacturers, and the American Petroleum Institute
intervened as defendants in Juliana v. U.S. They offer similar legal
arguments to the U.S. government. Their framing of the Plaintiffs’ case
is interesting. They describe the Plaintiffs as:
a group of environmental organizations and individuals
seeking the same extraordinary relief: to commandeer the
authority of many federal agencies to direct them “to cease
328 Id. at 7–8.
329 Id. at 11–12.
330 Id. at 14–15.
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their permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing of fossil
fuels” and take whatever other actions are “necessary” to
drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. to
levels these plaintiffs deem acceptable.331
Further, they argue that the Plaintiffs’ claims are not within federal
court jurisdiction “because if allowed to proceed they would empower a
group of private citizens to compel through judicial fiat the exercise of
sweeping legislative and executive authority conferred by our Constitu-
tion exclusively to the political branches, in violation of standing and
separation-of-powers principles.”332 This echoes the framing offered in the
R.J. Reynolds memo on smoking, invoking the specter of large-scale
government intervention. But in this framing, environmental organiza-
tions are described as seeking to “commandeer” government authority to
force widespread intervention in the U.S. economy.
c. Legal Status of Juliana v. U.S.
In a groundbreaking November 2016 ruling, U.S. District Court
Judge Anne Aiken denied the U.S. government’s and the Intervenor-
Defendants’ motions to dismiss in Juliana v. U.S., clearing the way for
the case to proceed to trial.333 In a press release announcing Judge Aiken’s
denial of the motions to dismiss, Our Children’s Trust framed the Court’s
decision in the following terms:
This court just gave the youth of this country the critical
opportunity to protect their futures. In what will be the
trial of the millennium, these young plaintiffs will prove
that their federal government, in cooperation with the fossil
fuel industry, has knowingly put them in grave danger,
trading their futures for present convenience and gross
profits for a few.334
331 Mem. in Supp. of Intervenor-Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Juliana v. U.S., No. 6:15-cv
-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b044262
70152febe0/t/576195a62fe1316f09d2eeba/1466013096665/15.11.12.IntervenorMTD
Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7ZR-VU5H].
332 Id. at 2.
333 Opinion and Order at 3, Juliana v. U.S., No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept.10, 2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5824e85e6a49638
292ddd1c9/1478813795912/Order+MTD.Aiken.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMX8-GWZD].
334 Press Release, Our Children’s Trust & Earth Guardians, Victory for America’s
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After the Defendants’ motions to dismiss were denied, the
Intervenor-Defendants filed a motion to withdraw from the case.335 Judge
Coffin granted the Intervenor-Defendants’ request to withdraw.336 The
move to withdraw signals that the fossil fuel industry groups understand
the importance of the trial and the potential legal and public relations
ramifications of the climate lawsuit. As of the writing of this Article, the
case was set for trial in February 2018.337
2. Psychological Analysis
The fact that the Court in Juliana v. U.S. denied the Defendants’
motions to dismiss demonstrates that the Plaintiffs presented arguments
that have potential to succeed on the legal merits. But can those same
claims help build support for climate mitigation in the minds of the U.S.
public?
As previously discussed, laypeople often rely on simple heuristics,
or judgment rules, when assessing environmental risks.338 This can make
laypeople underestimate the risks of less visceral or emotionally charged
dangers, like climate change.339 Juliana v. U.S. might help overcome that
climate change communications hurdle because it describes the dangers
of climate change in vivid, gripping terms. The case has already gener-
ated immense media coverage340 and, as a showdown now looms with the
Trump administration, stands ready to generate more. The Plaintiffs use
more than eighty paragraphs in their complaint detailing how climate
Youth—Constitutional Climate Lawsuit against U.S. to Proceed (Nov. 10, 2016), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5824e5cd8419c279f4469e
8d/1478813133942/2016.11.10Aiken+Decision+PR+.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MRY-HXVQ].
335 Order at 1, Juliana v. U.S., No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/59541c8db3db2b21ddf4c1
7e/1498684558660/2017.07.28+Order+Granting+Motions+to+Withdraw-Setting
+Trial+Date.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSE2-9DC6].
336 Id.
337 Id. at 5.
338 Kahan, supra note 108, at 408.
339 Id.
340 See, e.g., Coco McPherson, High-Stakes Climate Lawsuit Led By Youth Turns Its
Attentions to Trump, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.rollingstone.com/poli
tics/features/youth-led-high-stakes-climate-lawsuit-shifts-focus-to-trump-w473224
[https://perma.cc/XE82-TQ3Y]; Matthew O. Berger, Teens challenge US government for
not protecting them from climate change, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/09/climate-change-teens-sue-us-government-failing-pro
tect [https://perma.cc/43X3-QMUN].
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change is affecting and will continue to affect them. For example, in
alleging how climate change will affect Xiuhtezcatl Tonatiuh M., a
fifteen-year-old citizen from Colorado, the complaint states:
Climate change also harms Xiuhtezcatl’s personal safety,
property, and recreational interests through the resulting
increased frequency and intensity of wildfires, drought,
declining snowpack, pine-beetle infested forests, and ex-
treme flooding near his home in Colorado. Xiuhtezcatl’s
home, including the forests that he relies upon for his
spiritual, physical, emotional, and mental wellbeing, will
continue to die and burn as climate change worsens. Wa-
ter will become increasingly scarce, adversely impacting
every aspect of his life.341
The press release accompanying the filing of the complaint also under-
scores the threats faced by the youth Plaintiffs.342 As will be discussed
later in this Part, the vivid descriptions of climate threats might be even
more salient to the American public given the age of those facing the
threats. Although the Plaintiffs’ case might help overcome the cognitive
hurdle of heuristic-driven information processing when communicated
to the U.S. public, the case might exacerbate the cognitive features under-
lying motivated reasoning. As Dan Kahan noted, individuals with a
hierarchical, individualistic worldview “intuitively perceive that wide-
spread acceptance of [environmental] risks would license restrictions on
commerce and industry.”343 Here, the Plaintiffs’ complaint named as
Defendants all of the government agencies or departments “primarily
responsible for authorizing, permitting, and incentivizing fossil fuel
production, consumption, transportation, and combustion.”344 In doing so,
the Plaintiffs are signaling that their case could have profound and far-
reaching consequences for the fossil fuel industry in the United States.
As mentioned above, the Intervenor-Defendants underscored this mes-
sage in their framing of the case. Media coverage of the litigation could
reinforce the message that acting on climate change could have profound
consequences for industry, thereby making it harder for certain segments
of the population to accept the threat of climate change.
341 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶¶ 20–21.
342 Youth File Climate Lawsuit, supra note 312.
343 Kahan et al., supra note 128, at 733.
344 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶ 130.
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Several features of the Plaintiffs’ case in Juliana v. U.S. can help
activate the public’s moral intuition about climate change, which can in
turn motivate the public to take action on climate change. The first such
feature is how the case centers blame for climate change. As previously
discussed, when harms are perceived as unintentional they are judged
less intensely by the public.345 Litigation is a potentially powerful way to
enhance the public’s moral intuition about climate change because its
adversarial nature requires plaintiffs to target specific defendants for
injuries arising from climate change. In Juliana v. U.S., the Plaintiffs
emphatically and repeatedly point out the intentionality and immorality
of the U.S. government’s actions. For example, the press release accom-
panying the complaint cites one of the Plaintiffs as saying:
The Federal Government has known for decades that CO2
pollution from burning fossil fuels was causing global
warming and dangerous climate change. It also knew that
continuing to burn fossil fuels would destabilize our cli-
mate system, significantly harming my generation and
generations to come. Despite knowing these dangers, De-
fendants did nothing to prevent this harm. In fact, my
Government increased the concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere to levels it knew were unsafe.346
This narrative may be even more salient to the U.S. public because
of the identity of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are young people from across
the United States; the youngest Plaintiff, Levi D., was only eight years old
at the time the complaint was filed.347 Scholars have noted that the public
finds it hard to identify with climate change victims, because those victims
can appear distant in time and space.348 To overcome this disconnect, they
suggest that climate communicators employ techniques “that increase
individuals’ affinity and identification with future generations.”349 The
Plaintiffs’ complaint outlines in vivid detail how youth and children from
all across the United States are already feeling the impacts of climate
change and how those impacts will worsen in the future.350 The young
345 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 244.
346 Youth File Climate Lawsuit, supra note 312.
347 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶ 81.
348 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 245.
349 Id.
350 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶¶ 16–91.
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Plaintiffs also appear in interviews.351 In doing so, they make it harder
to dismiss the victims of climate change as nameless, faceless individuals.
3. Framing Analysis
According to the framing insights discussed in Part III, there are
several aspects of the Plaintiffs’ suit that make their framing of climate
change more salient to the public. The first is that the Plaintiffs have
presented climate change as a danger involuntarily imposed on them. As
Lawrence explained, one of the key factors that determines how the
framing of a public health risk will influence public opinion is “whether
the health risk is portrayed as ‘acquired deliberately or involuntarily
(and the victim correspondingly as culpable or innocent).’ ”352 Once again,
the identity of the Plaintiffs is key. The youth of the Plaintiffs, with one
as young as eight years old, supports the frame of innocent victims
having a dangerous threat imposed on them by other actors. The com-
plaint underscores this frame, stating that the Plaintiffs have “no voting
rights and little, if any, political power” and “will disproportionately
experience the irreversible and catastrophic impacts of an atmosphere
and oceans containing dangerous levels of CO2.”353 Some scholars have
argued that the evidence around second-hand smoking, and the realiza-
tion that smoking was claiming innocent victims, was key to the
reframing of the public debate around smoking.354 There is a pervasive
climate change narrative that everyone is responsible for climate change
and thus, in a sense, nobody is responsible. But it is much harder to
argue that an eight-year-old is responsible for climate change.
As mentioned above, the Plaintiffs also allege that the U.S.
government knowingly and intentionally contributed to the dangers of
climate change over many decades. Framing a public health risk as
intentionally created also influences how the public apportions blame for
that risk.355 The Plaintiffs also frame climate change as a universal risk,
and one arising from the environment, satisfying all four factors high-
lighted by Lawrence for how to shift a public health debate. As she writes,
351 See, e.g., DEMOCRACY NOW, Landmark Climate Lawsuit: Meet the Youth Activists Suing
the U.S. Government & Fossil Fuel Industry (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.democracynow
.org/2016/4/14/landmark_climate_lawsuit_meet_the_youth [https://perma.cc/PY4U-HCHU].
352 Lawrence, supra note 197, at 59.
353 Youth Complaint, supra note 313, ¶¶ 294, 296.
354 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 197, at 59.
355 Id.
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“[t]he more an issue is framed in terms of involuntary risk, universal
risk, environmental risk, and knowingly created risk, the more likely the
opinion environment is to be conducive to public policy solutions that
burden powerful groups.”356
Another factor that might make the Plaintiffs’ framing of climate
change more salient to the public is its use of a voucher as a Plaintiff. Dr.
James E. Hansen is one of the most prominent figures in climate change
advocacy, and his presence as a Plaintiff in the suit could have a signifi-
cant impact on how the information in the litigation is received by the
US public.
Although the Plaintiffs’ framing of climate change has many
features that will make it resonate with the public, it could also feed into
a less helpful climate frame. The suit is aimed at challenging the federal
government’s support and approval of the fossil fuel industry and could
reinforce the popular US frame that acting on climate change will lead
to “dire economic consequences.”357
Ultimately, climate narratives cannot appeal to all audiences. There
are many different messages that climate advocates need to communicate
to different audiences—that climate change is real, that it is happening
now, that it poses a profound danger, that there are important ways the
public can and must act to mitigate the worst of the threats of climate
change, and that certain powerful actors are disproportionately responsi-
ble for climate change and must therefore intervene to address the dangers.
This lawsuit may not be the best vehicle for communicating to conserva-
tives in the United States, but it does send a powerful message to those
who believe in climate change but are not sure who is responsible for
addressing it and do not understand how imminent the dangers are.
C. The Climate Necessity Defense
Although this Article has focused on climate change litigation
initiated by climate advocates as plaintiffs, there is a novel and poten-
tially significant litigation strategy that several organizations and activists
are trying to use as a defense in criminal trials for climate activism. The
defense, called the climate necessity defense, builds on the US tradition
of civil disobedients presenting a necessity defense.358 The necessity
356 Id.
357 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 19, at 721.
358 John Alan Cohan, Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defense, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 111,
111 (2007).
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defense “asserts that breaking the law was justified in order to avert a
greater harm that would occur as a result of the government policy the
offender was protesting.”359 Activists have recently begun using the defense
in the context of climate change in the United States and other jurisdic-
tions.360 The climate necessity defense has never yet succeeded in the
United States, although activists are hopeful that it will soon.361 So what
does the defense entail? The Climate Defense Project, a non-profit deliv-
ering legal support for climate activists,362 describes the basic legal thrust
of the defense in the following terms:
The requirements of a necessity defense vary by jurisdic-
tion but usually require a showing that the defendant a)
faced an imminent danger, b) took action to prevent that
danger through less harmful means, c) reasonably antici-
pated that the action would prevent the danger, and d)
had no reasonable legal alternative to the action.363
One of the difficulties climate advocates hoping to use the climate
necessity defense have encountered is that judges have refused to allow
the defense to be presented to a jury at trial.364 This is similar to other
attempts to use political necessity, where “[i]n most instances . . . courts
will rule as a matter of law that the actors have failed in the offer of
proof regarding the elements of the necessity defense so that the jury
rarely is given the chance to weigh in on the matter.”365 Nonetheless, the
climate necessity defense is an important legal strategy to focus on in
this Article because its explicit purpose is to generate media attention
and public debate about the need for action on climate change. When
defendants elect to use the climate necessity defense, they are harnessing
“the procedures and language of the legal system to educate the public
359 Id.
360 See, e.g., CLIMATE DEF. PROJECT, Climate Necessity Defense Case Guide: A Guide for
Activists and Attorneys, https://climatedefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03
/CDP-ClimateNecessityOutcomes-Feb-8-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CPB-SPPW] (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Climate Necessity Defense Guide].
361 The Climate Necessity Defense: A Legal Tool for Climate Activists, CLIMATE DISOBE-
DIENCE CTR., http://www.climatedisobedience.org/necessitydefense [https://perma.cc/74VS
-FVC6] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018)
362 CLIMATE DEF. PROJECT, About, https://climatedefenseproject.org/about/ [https://perma
.cc/JFM6-H6NJ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
363 Climate Necessity Defense Guide, supra note 360, at 1.
364 Id.
365 Cohan, supra note 358, at 112.
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about the risks of climate change, the inaction and corruption of state
and federal governments, and the need for citizen action to change our
energy politics.”366 To provide a concrete example of the climate necessity
defense, I will discuss Washington v. Brockway or the “Delta Five” case.
1. Washington v. Brockway
In 2014, five climate activists now known as the “Delta Five,”
Abby Brockway, Michael LaPointe, Patrick Mazza, Jackie Minchew, and
Elizabeth Spoerri, trespassed onto a rail yard in Everett, Washington
and chained themselves to a structure they erected to block trains carry-
ing crude oil.367 The five climate activists were charged with obstructing
or delaying a train and second-degree criminal trespass.368 The Defen-
dants wanted to present a climate necessity defense at trial.369 In Wash-
ington, when a court finds that the necessity defense is available to the
jury, the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1. the defendant reasonably believed the commission
of the crime was necessary to avoid or minimize a
harm; and
2. the harm sought to be avoided was greater than
the harm resulting from a violation of the law; and
3. the threatened harm was not brought about by the
defendant; and
4. no reasonable legal alternative existed.370
There was a flurry of pretrial and trial actions centering on whether
the Defendants could use the climate necessity defense at trial.371 The
State objected to the presentation of the defense, arguing that it was not
applicable to the case at hand. In arguing against the first element of the
defense, the State wrote that:
366 Climate Necessity Defense Guide, supra note 360, at 1.
367 Lance N. Long & Ted Hamilton, Case Comment—Washington v. Brockway: One Small
Step Closer to Climate Necessity, 13 MCGILL J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 153, 153 (2017).
368 Id.
369 Id. at 168.
370 Order Denying Def. Motion to Allow Aff. Def. Of Necessity and Expert Witness Testi-
mony at 4, Washington v. Brockway, Case No. 5053A-14D (Snohomish Cty. Dist. Ct. Wash.
Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.desmogblog.com/sites/beta.desmogblog.com/files/Brockway
%20Judge%20%20first%20Order%20rejecting%20experts%201%204%2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XAC8-UR2D].
371 Long & Hamilton, supra note 367, at 168.
2018] CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION AND NARRATIVE 795
The state has no doubt the Defendants subjectively be-
lieved that the commission of their crimes was necessary
to avoid harm, but did they really achieve that goal? There
is no evidence that [the Defendants’] eight hour protest has
made [the railway company] employ a safer system, or that
it prevented global warming. There is no evidence that the
Defendants protest put a dent into carbon emissions that
are put into the air every day. There is no evidence that cli-
mate change awareness has increased due to their action.
And there is no evidence that their belief was reasonable.372
The Court initially denied the Defendants’ motion to allow them
to present a necessity defense, then later reversed itself, granting the
Defendants’ motion to reconsider.373 The Defendants were given the right
to present expert testimony to support the elements of the necessity
defense and they did so by:
presenting substantial evidence related to the dangers of
climate change and crude oil transport, [the railway com-
pany]’s poor safety record and control over state regula-
tory bodies, and the inefficacy of past attempts at legal
advocacy . . . . A variety of experts from several scientific
and social fields of inquiry testified to the harms presented
by the transport of crude oil.374
After hearing expert testimony, the Court ultimately ruled against allow-
ing the jury to be given instruction on the climate necessity defense and
prohibited them from considering expert testimony connected to the
defense.375 Ultimately, the jury found the Defendants guilty of trespass-
ing, but not of obstructing or delaying a train, and the Defendants were
given two years of probation.376
Washington v. Brockway remains an important case because it is
the first case in the United States where the jury heard testimony on the
372 State’s Response to Def. Motion to Allow Affirmative Def. and to Call Expert Witnesses
at 3–4, Washington v. Brockway, Case No. 5053A-14D (Snohomish Cty. Dist. Ct. Wash.
Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter State’s Response].
373 Long & Hamilton, supra note 367, at 170.
374 Id. at 171.
375 Id. at 172.
376 Stephen Quirke, Delta 5 Defendants Acquitted of Major Charges, EARTH ISLAND J.
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/delta_5_de
fendants_acquitted_of_major_charges/ [https://perma.cc/V6HY-P5J2].
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climate necessity defense, even if it did not get to use that testimony in
making its decision.377 The jury’s response, collected after the trial was
over, indicates the potential significance of the defense. According to the
Earth Island Journal:
In the halls outside the courtroom, three members of the
jury admitted they would have acquitted the defendants had
they received a necessity instruction from the judge. They
also thanked the defendants for giving them an education
on climate change, agreed to support the Climate Disobe-
dience Center in future cases, and signed up with defendant
Abby Brockway to lobby the state on oil trains.378
2. Psychological Analysis
The climate necessity defense differs from the other two litigation
strategies discussed above because its explicit purpose is to be a political
tactic—a strategy to generate media attention and to force jury members
and the larger public to weigh the harms of climate change. In Washington
v. Brockway Judge Howard made the following comments, underscoring
this element of the necessity defense:
In other cases, at least that I am aware of, the defendants
were not even able to present . . . their viewpoints in an
effort to get this defense before the jury, and so I certainly
hope that regardless of my ruling, there is some value seen
in having been able to present in a public forum your points
of view regarding these issues. I also would note that given
the public attention that clearly is here today, that you have,
regardless of whether you argued necessity or not, achieved
much of what you sought to achieve.379
Because shifting the public discourse around climate change is such an in-
tegral part of the climate necessity defense—equal to if not more impor-
tant than its substantive legal merit—it is even more important to analyze
the legal strategy through a psychological and framing lens. Is the climate
necessity defense telling the climate change story its proponents hope to
convey to the US public and is it doing so in a compelling way?
377 Long & Hamilton, supra note 367, at 172.
378 Quirke, supra note 376, at 1–2.
379 Long & Hamilton, supra note 367, at 173 (emphasis added).
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One of the key hurdles preventing the public from understanding
and engaging with tragedies of the commons is the scientific uncertainty
surrounding such tragedies.380 To make out the elements of a climate
necessity defense, the Defendants in Washington v. Brockway relied on
the testimony of a group of expert witnesses. One expert “testified about
the local and regional impacts of climate change, such as reduction in
snow pack, more severe weather events, wildfires, and adverse effects on
fisheries.”381 Another expert, a medical doctor, “testified about the health
impacts of crude transport and the proposed coal-shipping terminal in
Bellingham, Washington.”382 This testimony does several things that can
help overcome the cognitive hurdles preventing the public from compre-
hending tragedies of the commons. It provides scientific evidence that can
help reduce scientific uncertainty about climate change. It also highlights
the present costs of the problem of climate change, by underscoring the
current dangers of and impacts of transporting crude oil through Wash-
ington. Finally, it draws a connection between the transport of crude oil
and climate change. As mentioned previously, it is very difficult for the
public to see how its actions affect climate change; by underscoring how
local fossil fuel production and transport contribute to the dangers of
climate change this instance of the climate necessity defense may help
the public draw the necessary connection.
One theme that arises again and again in the research about
climate psychology and framing is that when the public perceives a risk
as distant in time or space, or as uncertain, it makes it difficult for the pub-
lic to take that risk seriously. In discussing why the public has difficulty
engaging with tragedies of the commons, Thompson explains that when
future losses are uncertain, “people often act as if there’s virtually no future
risks to them at all.”383 One of the key features that makes it difficult to
catalyze the public’s moral intuition about climate change is that its vic-
tims are seen as distant in time and space. As Markowitz and Shariff note,
“past research provides indirect evidence to suggest that the more dissim-
ilar and socially distant the victims of climate change seem to be—be they
members of faraway communities or, perhaps, future generations—the
less morally obligated people will feel to act on their behalf.”384 Even the
380 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 258.
381 Long & Hamilton, supra note 367, at 171.
382 Id.
383 Thompson, Jr., supra note 61, at 264.
384 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 245.
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name of the climate necessity defense challenges the narrative that cli-
mate risks are distant in time and space. The defense hinges on proving
that the Defendants “faced an imminent danger.”385 If allowed to present
their defense to a jury, Defendants would offer expert testimony from
scientists and health officials that the threat of climate change is imminent.
Such testimony would present climate change as a pressing and known
danger, rather than a distant and uncertain threat.
In the case of Washington v. Brockway, the narrative about the
imminence of the danger and necessity of action on climate change reso-
nated with the jurors. Seattle newspaper, The Stranger, ran an article on
the litigation with the following quotes from jurors in the Washington v.
Brockway case:
“There’s this very narrow window of time when traffic is
going to exponentially increase on this toxic product com-
ing through our neighborhoods to make a buck—while a
buck is able to be made—before it closes,” Lundheim, one
of the jurors, said.
He continued: “It’s not going to be available forever, this
whole fossil fuel thing. China’s not going to want coal for-
ever, they want to get off it as soon as they can. And peo-
ple know that. But there’s this, ‘Quick, let’s make money
here, we’ll push it through Washington.’ And I know this
because I’ve been listening to this stuff all week long, so
thank you for that.”
“We don’t want to be the corridor,” McGowan, his fellow
juror, added.386
Not only did the jurors receive a new perspective on climate change, their
change of heart, as well as a description of the climate necessity defense,
were covered by The Stranger and reached a much wider audience.
As previously mentioned, litigation can be an ideal tactic for
enhancing the public’s moral intuition about climate change because in
385 Climate Necessity Defense Guide, supra note 360, at 1.
386 Sydney Brownstone, The Delta 5 Verdict Is In: Guilty and Not Guilty, But In the End
No Jail Time for Blocking Oil Train, THE STRANGER (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.the
stranger.com/blogs/slog/2016/01/15/23429598/the-delta-5-verdict-is-in-guilty-and-not
-guilty [https://perma.cc/3Z8V-ELPB].
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pro-regulatory climate litigation plaintiffs must assign blame for injuries
arising from climate change to the action of defendants. This challenges the
narrative that climate change is the result of blameless action and can help
the public see climate change through an ethical lens.387 The climate neces-
sity defense offers an interesting twist because climate activists actually
serve as defendants in the litigation strategy. The defense forces the public
to consider the morality of climate change and weigh the competing morali-
ties of civil disobedience and government support of fossil fuel production:
Whether or not a necessity defense gets protesters off the
hook, it turns the trial—deliberately—into a policy refer-
endum rather than just a legal proceeding. Defendants
pleading necessity must convince the jury that their ac-
tions were required to avoid a “greater evil”—which means,
as part of that argument, the jury hears about this “greater
evil” in detail. And juries are essentially asked to pass
judgment on the morality of government policy and their
fellow citizens’ resistance to it.
This way of framing the issue allows activists to appeal to
basic feelings of unfairness and injustice. “Underlying
these protests is the sentiment that the government itself
is acting illegally—the government’s permission to the
fossil fuel companies amounts to property damage and
amounts to a breach of trust to the American people,” said
Mary Wood, a professor at the University of Oregon School
of Law and author of the book “Nature’s Trust,” which
advocates a more aggressive and consistent approach to
environmental regulation.388
When people view climate change through a moral lens, they are
more likely to support policies addressing climate change.389 Thus forcing
the public to see climate change through such an explicitly moral
framework—in a criminal trial—may motivate them to act.
387 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153, at 244.
388 Joseph E. Hamilton, The climate made me do it!: Environmental protesters are poised
to try out the ‘necessity defense,’ BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe
.com/ideas/2014/08/16/the-climate-made/SyBQ7d95ZG0QoiJBHI17KK/story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/08/16/the-climate
-made/SyBQ7d95ZG0QoiJBHI17KK/story.html].
389 Markowitz & Shariff, supra note 153.
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The climate necessity defense might also activate a feeling of self-
efficacy, or “a sense of being able to do anything about climate change”390
for members of the public. It demonstrates how a small group of people
engaging in civil disobedience can have a large impact on the public de-
bate about climate change.
3. Framing Analysis
Climate advocates trying to use the climate necessity defense
have framed climate change as an imminent threat to the public and the
result of immoral action. While the climate necessity defense clearly has
potential to shift public discourse around climate change, the framing of
climate pushed by its advocates has been countered by the government.
The State’s response in Washington v. Brockway offers insights into the
kind of counter-narratives used against the climate necessity defense.
The State derides the Delta 5 as self-aggrandizing idealists, writing that:
“Defendants seek to put their actions . . . in the same vein as those who
stood up to South Africa’s Apartheid system and Jim Crow laws of the
South.”391 It also emphasizes how the Defendants wasted time and state
resources yet made no dent in GHG emissions.392 The State also argues
that there was no necessity involved, writing:
A group of protesters walked onto clearly marked private
property, ignored the no trespassing signs, stopped a train
with a lit flare, and then the Defendants locked them-
selves to a tripod for the better part of eight hours, costing
the [railway company] thousands of dollars. That is not
necessity, it is choice.393
Yet even as the State pushes back against the Defendants’ argu-
ments, it admits that climate change is a danger and that the Defen-
dants’ actions were the lesser of two moral wrongs: “The State concedes
that the harm of global warming and/or oil spillage and explosion is
greater than the commission of two simple misdemeanors.”394
The climate necessity defense already offers a psychologically com-
pelling framing of climate change, but that framing might be even more
390 O’Neill et al., supra note 286, at 414.
391 State’s Response, supra note 372, at 3.
392 Id. at 2–4.
393 Id. at 9.
394 Id. at 4.
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compelling if presented by different defendants. For instance, having
faith leaders as defendants, invoking the moral imperative of government
action on climate change, could appeal to different audiences within the
American public. In the same vein, having defendants who identify as
Republican or conservative could enhance the narrative being offered by
the climate necessity defense, appealing to more individualistic, hierar-
chical individuals. Additionally, as discussed above, when children and
youth are parties to climate litigation they underscore the narrative that
climate change is a danger threatening innocent victims who did not
partake in creating the danger. By having youth as defendants present-
ing the climate necessity defense, the message could resonate even more
profoundly with the court and the public. However, unlike the litigation
being initiated by Our Children’s Trust, the climate necessity defense is
a defense to criminal charges. There is real legal risk to defendants who
participate in climate-oriented civil disobedience, get charged by the
state, and present climate necessity as their defense.
In sum, I have analyzed three topical litigation strategies that I
think present an opportunity of overcoming the public’s psychological
hurdles to engaging with climate change and offer a narrative on climate
change that will resonate with the public. Using the insights from re-
search on the importance of psychological hurdles and framing to climate
change communications that I discussed in Parts II and III, I have
analyzed these three litigation strategies, highlighting their potential
narrative strengths and drawbacks. As climate change litigation contin-
ues to proliferate, and become ever more significant in generating cli-
mate action at the federal level, climate advocates must draw from
research on climate psychology and framing to create litigation strategies
that tell the most compelling stories on climate change. In the case of the
necessity defense, the defense itself has never actually been deliberated
over by a jury in the United States and yet it has still generated signifi-
cant media coverage. Regardless of outcome, climate change lawsuits
informed by theories discussed in this Article present powerful opportu-
nities to positively impact public and political discourse. There is a need
for more research on how litigation strategies and their attendant cam-
paigns can utilize those opportunities most effectively.
CONCLUSION
There is scientific consensus that the world needs to take swift and
profound action to mitigate the impending dangers of climate change. As
one of the largest emitters of GHGs in the world, it is especially important
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that the United States take action to reduce its emissions. Yet, the US pub-
lic has not uniformly called for or supported aggressive action on climate
change. A substantial portion of the US public still either does not believe
in anthropogenic climate change or does not believe the threat will affect
them. Given the results of the 2016 US federal election, it looks unlikely
that the federal legislative or executive branches will act to address cli-
mate change in the near future. With their options limited, climate ad-
vocates are turning to the judicial branch and climate litigation to catalyze
action on climate change. Climate change litigation has ballooned in the
United States in the last decade. There are numerous legal strategies
climate advocates can employ when initiating climate change litigation.
Scholars have documented how litigation can generate media
coverage, help build social movements, and shift the public dialogue around
issues like climate change. Given the gap between scientific consensus
on the existence and immediacy of the threat of climate change and the
public’s perception of the danger, it is critical to change how the public
engages with the science of climate change. Litigation offers a unique
opportunity to do just that in the current social and political context.
To understand how climate change litigation might tell the most
compelling stories in the courtroom and in the public sphere, I analyzed
research on climate psychology and climate framing. Research on why
the public has trouble addressing tragedies of the commons, why it is
important to activate moral intuition on climate change, and how laypeople
assess environmental risks offered important insights into what effective
climate change communications could look like. Research from framing
theory showed how small shifts in the framing of public health issues
like climate change can have profound impacts on public perceptions of
who is responsible for those issues and who should act to address them.
I applied these insights to three topical litigation strategies, the
Climate Law in our Hands campaign, litigation initiated by Our Children’s
Trust, and the climate necessity defense, to analyze how climate litigation
campaigns are or are not telling stories that can shift the public dialogue
and overcome the public’s cognitive hurdles to engaging with climate
change. I chose three strategies that I thought were using creative tactics
to shift the narrative on climate change and found that those strategies
largely conformed with suggestions from the social sciences literature for
how to make climate change communications more salient to the public.
I argue that climate change litigation presents a unique opportu-
nity to shape public discourse and advance the climate movement. The
structure of litigation, which requires plaintiffs to trace the actions of
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defendants to the plaintiffs’ injuries—including injuries related to health,
finances, and property—allows climate advocates to leverage insights
from the social sciences to make their climate change narratives as salient
as possible. Underlying many of the cognitive hurdles to the public’s
engagement with climate change is the fact that the climate threat seems
distant in time and space, and less visceral than other threats. Creative
climate ligation strategies can potentially challenge that narrative on
climate change by, among other things, having young people as plaintiffs,
highlighting the current costs of climate change, and describing in vivid
detail how climate change is already injuring citizens.
Another creative strategy that could help overcome the public’s
hurdles to engaging with climate change is involving as many citizens as
possible in climate change litigation. Climate advocates can help the
public recognize an often invisible collective action problem and seek
consensus on fair solutions to that problem by facilitating public discus-
sion of the threat of climate change. Even when climate advocates are
acting as defendants, the structure of litigation allows them to force the
court and the public to reflect on the relative wrongs of civil disobedience
and government inaction on climate change. Indeed, litigation can allow
climate change to be framed in moral terms, which can be highly moti-
vating for the public. Additionally, the climate necessity defense demon-
strates how a litigation strategy can influence the public discourse on
climate change even when it is not successful in court.
The more public health problems, like climate change, are framed
as involving involuntary, universal, environmental, and knowingly created
risks, the more likely the public debate will shift towards the necessity
of intervention by government and industry members. Litigation is an
ideal vehicle to frame climate change in terms of all four of these dimen-
sions. Litigation is particularly effective at highlighting how the risks of
climate change have been involuntary imposed on certain parties, includ-
ing children and future generations. It also allows climate advocates to
argue that the dangers of climate change have been intentionally created
by certain actors, including governments and industry members.
This Article is a preliminary investigation into how the social sci-
ences could be leveraged to tell compelling climate stories in pro-regulatory
climate litigation. Research on the public’s cognitive challenges to engag-
ing with climate change and on strategies to overcome those hurdles is
rapidly expanding. Given that litigation is one of the most potent remain-
ing tools for climate advocates, it is critical for lawyers to draw from that
research and further investigate its potential to tell compelling climate
stories through litigation.

